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THE ACTION FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS
ROBERT C. BROWN't
The most important legal action given for the purpose of protecting
marital relations from unjustifiable interference by outsiders is what is
known as the action for alienation of affections. This action has its ultimate
purpose and its substantial justification, if any, in the interest of the public
in the protection from intentional and unjustifiable interference with the
stability of the home. It is the purpose of this paper to examine some of
the outstanding features of this somewhat unique form of action.
Despite the name which is universally given to this action, it is almost
unanimously agreed that the gist of it is not the loss of affections but rather
the loss of consortium '-a concept of very much broader content.2  Con-
sortium includes at least the sole right to sexual relationship and society and
companionship of the spouse as well as affection. 3 Since the action protects
all aspects of the marital consortium it may be maintained although no pecu-
niary loss be shown; 4 nor need any actual loss of service or support be
proved. 5 In fact, the loss of affection, far from being the gist of the action,
has sometimes been held merely to aggravate damages in the case of loss of
consortium in other respects.6 Consortium is a property right, and it would
seem to follow that the action for alienation of affections is to be treated as
one for a tort to property ;7 even though, as is the case with the action of
seduction at common law, the damages are based primarily upon personal
injuries to the plaintiff.
t A. B. 1914, Wesleyan University; LL. B. 1917, S. 3. D. 193o, Harvard University;
Professor of Law, Indiana University. Author of Reduction of Tax Exemptions by Reason
of Receipt of Tax-Exempt Income (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. Rav. 534; State Taxation of Inter-
state Commerce and Federal and State Taxation in Intergovernmental Relations-93o-I932
(1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 247; and contributor to other legal periodicals.
I Winsmore v. Greenback, Willes 577 (Eng. 1745) (probably the earliest case) ; Boland
v. Stanley, 88 Ark. 562, 115 S. W. 163 (19o9) ; Jenness v. Simpson, 84 Vt. 127, 78 Atl. 886
(1911) ; Valentine v. Pollak, 95 Conn. 556, Iii AtI. 869 (192o) ; Lane v. Dunning, 186 Ky.
797, 218 S. W. 269 (1920) ; Brown v. Brown, lO4 Okla. 206, 230 Pac. 853 (1924) ; Anderson
v. McGill Club, 51 Nev. 16, 266 Pac. 913 (1928) ; Riggs v. Smith, 52 Idaho 43, II P. (2d)
358 (932).
2Rott v. Goehring, 33 N. D. 413, 157 N. W. 294 (1916).
' Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 123 (1883).
'Adams v. Main, 3 Ind. App. 232, 29 N. E. 792 (1891).
Gregg v. Gregg, 37 Ind. App. 210, 75 N. E. 674 (19o).
" Evans v. O'Connor, 174 Mass. 287, 54 N. E. 557 (1899); Dodge v. Rush, 28 App. D. C.
149 (19o6).
7 Warren v. Warren, 89 Mich. 123, 50 N. W. 842 (1891); Crane v. Ketcham, 83 N. J. L.
327, 84 Atl. 1052 (1912). But see Howard v. Lunaburg, 192 Wis. 507, 213 N. W. 301 (1927).
In Allard v. LaPlain, 147 Wash. 497, 266 Pac. 688 (1928), it was held that a judgment
against a bankrupt in another state for alienation of the affections of the plaintiff's husband
was not discharged by the adjudication.
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There are one or two authorities which seem to take the position that
the gist of the action is loss of affection.8 Even such authorities, however,
take cognizance of other sorts of injuries to the consortium so that the
results are not really distinct from those of the jurisdictions which regard
the loss of consortium as the real point of the action.
A more serious problem arises in defining the relationship of this action
with that for criminal conversation. The two forms of action are obviously
closely connected and may be joined.9 Proof of loss of affection in the strict
sense will aggravate the damages in a count for criminal conversation;10
and conversely, proof of adultery will aggravate the damages in a count for
alienation of affections.:" Proof of adultery is sufficient to sustain an action
for criminal conversation, but it is insufficient to sustain an action for alien-
ation of affections since it is conceivable (though undoubtedly unusual) that
companionship or affection will be undiminished even though one of the
spouses has been led into adultery with an outsider. 1
2
It is not always easy to determine which of these actions is involved.
It is sometimes held that an allegation of adultery between the alienated
spouse and the defendant involves an action for criminal conversation as
well as alienation of affections; 13 but where the action is avowedly for crim-
inal conversation, an allegation of actual alienation of affections is normally
treated not as involving a separate count but merely for the purpose of
aggravating damages. 4 Indeed, it is rather more usual to treat an allegation
of adultery in an alienation action as incidental to the action rather than as
involving a separate count for criminal conversation.' 5  The adultery may
be involved not merely as aggravating damages but may itself be one of the
methods used to destroy the affections of the alienated spouse and to effect a
separation of the spouses.'0
It is obvious therefore that the gist of an action for criminal conversa-
tion is adultery, and that this is certainly not the primary basis of an action
for alienation of affections. In neither case, however, is the action, in form
8 Annarina v. Boland, 136 Md. 365, 111 Atl. 84 (I92o) ; Johnson v. Richards, 5o Idaho
150, 294 Pac. 5o7 (1930).
"Dodge v. Rush, supra note 6; Merritt v. Cravens, 168 Ky. 155, 181 S. W. 97o (1916);
Murrell v. Culver, 141 Md. 349, 118 Atl. 803 (1922) ; Labrie v. Midwood, 273 Mass. 578, 174
N. E. 214 (1931).
'0 Sullivan v. Valiquette, 66 Colo. 170, i8o Pac. 91 (1gig) ; Hargraves v. Ballou, 47 R. I.
186, 131 Ati. 643 (1926). See also Bigaouette v. Paulet, supra note 3.
n Barlow v. Barnes, 172 Cal. 98, 155 Pac. 457 (1916) ; Watkins v. Lord, 31 Idaho 352,
171 Pac. 1133 (igi8).
' Valentine v. Pollak, supra note i.
23 Valentine v. Pollak, supra note I; Bradbury v. Brooks, 82 Colo. 133, 257 Pac. 359
(1927).
U4 See cases cited supra note IO.
" Hart v. Knapp, 76 Conn. 135, 55 Atl. 1021 (19o3) ; Joseph v. Naylor, 257 Pa. 561, io
Atl. 846 (1917) ; Rhodes v. Meloy, 289 S. W. 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) ; Ireland v. Ward,
51 Ore. 1O2, 93 Pac. 932 (19 o 8) ; Hutchinson v. Taylor, 129 Cal. App. 369, 18 P. (2d) 722
(1933)i20 Deming v. Leising, 214 App. Div. 398, 212 N. Y. Supp. 213 (1925).
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at least, against the spouse of the plaintiff; accordingly condonation will not
bar an action even for criminal conversation.' 7 Nor will the plaintiff in a
criminal conversation or alienation action be barred by his own neglect to
safeguard his spouse from the seductions of the defendant.' s It has been
held that there is no distinction between the two kinds of action, that both
alienation and criminal conversation actions are based upon loss of consor-
tium.19 This is true in a sense, except that alienation actions involve a much
larger concept of consortium than is the case with criminal conversation
actions. The real difference between the two seems to be that in criminal
conversation actions the loss of consortium is conclusively presumed from
the mere proof of adultery; whereas in actions for alienation of affections
the actual injury to the affections or at least some loss of companionship of
the alienated spouse (though not necessarily amounting to an actual separa-
tion) must appear.2 0  The line between the two actions is necessarily some-
what indistinct, but criminal conversation is the more definite action. Its
defect, which the action for alienation of affections corrects, is that a crim-
inal conversation action furnishes no adequate protection against many
serious injuries to the marital relationship which may not involve adultery,
or if they do involve that offense, also involve an injury to consortium in
other aspects.
The Right to Maintain the Action
The distinct weight of authority permits the maintenance of an action
for alienation of affections in the strictest sense by the wronged spouse, or,
at least, very few jurisdictions seem to doubt the power of the husband to
maintain the action against one who alienates the affections of his wife.
Some American jurisdictions have sought to deny, or at least to limit the
action, but they have not proceeded very far in this direction.
The leading state which denies an action for alienation of affections is
Massachusetts. In that jurisdiction probably the leading case is Tasker v.
Stanley,21 where a husband was denied a right of action against another
man who had not merely alienated the affections of the plaintiff's wife but
had persuaded her to desert him. The reasoning of the court is based upon
two general propositions: first, that no harm would have been done by the
plaintiff's persuasion had it not been for the affirmative act of the wife
herself and, secondly, that under modern statutes emancipating married
'
TSikes v. Tippins, 85 Ga. 231, 11 S. E. 662 (i8go).
'Alex v. Strickland, iii Okla. 267, 239 Pac. 596 (1925).
" Miller v. Pearce, 86 Vt. 322, 85 Atl. 62o (913). See also Hart v. Knapp, supra note
'5.
20 Alex v. Strickland, supra note i8. See also Disch v. Closset, u18 Ore. I1, 244 Pac.
71 (1926). Cf. (918) 3 CORN. L. Q. 228.
" 153 Mass. 148, 26 N. E. 417 (89I). See also Geromini v. Brunelle, 214 Mass. 492, 102
N. E. 67 (1913).
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women from the control of their husbands, it is not very seriously wrong
for a wife to leave her husband.
It is submitted that both of these reasons are absurd. If the first is to
be applied it would seem to follow that no person can be put under criminal
liability if he confines his activities to urging someone else to actually commit
the crime, since in this case a crime would not have been committed had it not
been for the independent act of the person thus persuaded. And if the
court's construction of the emancipation statutes is correct their primary
purpose, or its effect, is to break up homes! Certainly no one would seriously
argue for this proposition.
It is not contended, of course, that the unsoundness of the result of
Tasker v. Stanley is entirely proved by this attack upon its reasoning. The
question of policy must be left for later consideration. In any event, the
Massachusetts authorities have adhered to their position that alienation of
affections is not of itself a ground for action in that state,2 2 though if other
grounds such as adultery appear the alienation of affections will aggravate
damages.23  Furthermore, the courts have gone a long way in stretching the
facts so as to find that infinitesimal amount of activity beyond alienation
which will give a cause of action. 24  Thus a mere showing of ill-will to the
plaintiff on the part of the defendant will justify an action on this general
basis. 25  This does not prove that Massachusetts is wrong in declining to
permit an action merely for alienation for affections, although it raises grave
doubts on that point.
26
A few other states have indicated an unwillingness to permit this
action. Of these the one which has taken the most definite position is
Louisiana,27 but Alabama 28 and California 29 have also indicated some
- Houghton v. Rice, 174 Mass. 366, 54 N. E. 843 (1899) ; Neville v. Gile, 174 Mass. 305,
54 N. E. 841 (1899); Negus v. Foot, 228 Mass. 375, 117 N. E. 351 (1917); Longe v. Satn-
ders, 246 Mass. 159, 140 N. E. 741 (1923).
' Labrie v. Midwood, supra note 9; Gahagan v. Church, 239 Mass. 558, 132 N. E. 357
(1921).
"Sherry v. Moore, 265 Mass. i89, 163 N. E. 9o6 (1928). Cf. decision on previous ap-
peal of this case in 258 Mass. 42o, 155 N. E. 441 (1927) ; Bradstreet v. Wallace, 254 Mass.
509, 15o N. E. 405 (1926).
Lanigan v. Lanigan, 222 Mass. 198, ilo N. E. 285 (915) ; Falk v. Falk, 279 Mass. 530,
181 N. E. 715 (1932). In both of these cases, the defendants were sufficiently close relatives
of the alienated spouse so that, under principles hereafter discussed, they probably could not
be held in any jurisdiction in the absence of the very malice upon which the court relied as
distinguishing them from Tasker v. Stanley, 153 Mass. 148, 26 N. E. 417 (1891).
' See, however, notes criticising this Massachusetts view in (1924) 9 CORN. L. Q. 20o;
and (1928) 22 ILL. L. REV. 557.
' It was held in Hennessey v. Wahlig, 155 La. 465, 99 So. 405 (1924), that an action
for alienation of affections would lie under the Louisiana Code. But this decision was over-
ruled by Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927), on the ground that an aliena-
tion action is solely for punitive damages, and such are not allowed in Louisiana. One may
concur in the court's condemnation of punitive damages, and yet disagree with the ruling that
no alienation action will lie. See (1928) 14 VA. L. Rrv. 582.
'Veal v. Conn, 215 Ala. 9o, 109 So. 754 (1926).
See Mohn v. Tingley, 191 Cal. 470, 217 Pac. 733 (1923).
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hostility. However, all these states, and especially the two last named, go
at least as far as Massachusetts in sustaining what are substantially alienation
actions.30 The result would seem to be that the few limitations upon the
substantive right to maintain this action are of trifling practical importance.
One requirement for sustaining the action is fairly obvious-that is
that the plaintiff and the alienated spouse be married at the time of the
defendant's acts complained of. But a marriage voidable because of the
lack of statutory age by one of the parties is nevertheless sufficient; 31 So is
a common law marriage, 32 even though the spouses had previously been cere-
monially married and divorced.33
But there remains what was until recently the most 'serious problem:
whether a wife could maintain the action when her husband was the alienated
spouse. It is obvious that a wife could not maintain the action at common
law, not because of its nature, but because she had no right to maintain any
action. In England an attempt was made fairly early to obviate this difficulty
by joining the husband himself as a party defendant ;3' but the effort was not
successful.
However, the common law as to husband and wife is no longer in effect
in any civilized jurisdiction, and the practical problem soon became to deter-
mine whether the ordinary emancipation statutes gave the wife a right to
maintain an action for alienation of affections. Probably the leading case
giving an affirmative answer to this question is the Indiana case of Hayes v.
Nowlin, 35 which presents a full and conclusive argument in favor of this
construction of the emancipation statutes. This doctrine has been followed
by the overwhelming weight of authority. 36 The fact that the wife is an
infant does not seem to affect her right to maintain the action.
3 1
The reasoning under which this result was reached is that at common
law the wife had the same right in the consortium of the husband as he had
in hers. Her disability was merely procedural; the right existed but it could
not be enforced. The emancipation statutes have removed this disability and
have thereby put her in the same position in respect to this action as her
* See Woodson v. Bailey, 21o Ala. 568, 98 So. 809 (1924) ; Mohn v. Tingley, supra note
29.
21 Luke v. Hill, 137 Ga. 159, 73 S. E. 345 (1911).
1 Hollinghausen v. Ade, 289 Mo. 362, 233 S. W. 39 (1921).
'Butterfield v. Ennis, 193 Mo. App. 638, 186 S. W. 1173 (1916).
" See Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577 (Eng. 1861).
Z 129 Ind. 581, 29 N. E. 389 (i89i).
"' Among the leading authorities to this effect are Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621
(1878) ; Seaver v. Adams, 66 N. H. 142, ig Atl. 776 (189o) ; Price v. Price, 91 Iowa 693, 6o
N. W. 202 (1894) ; Keen v. Keen, 49 Ore. 362, 90 Pac. 147 (19o7) ; Gross v. Gross, 70 W.
Va. 317, 73 S. E. 961 (1912); Weber v. Weber, 113 Ark. 471, 169 S. W. 318 (1914); Wood-
son v. Bailey, supra note 3o; Hoover v. Hoover, lO3 Fla. 846, 138 So. 373 (1931) ; Sessions
v. Parker, 174 Ga. 296, 162 So. 790 (1932).
-Warren v. Warren, supra note 7.
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husband has always been.38 Granting that this reasoning is somewhat ab-
stract and theoretical, it seems essentially sound and certainly leads to a
desirable result.
Only three jurisdictions have shown any disposition, at least recently,
to deny the right of the married woman to maintain this action; and one of
those, New jersey,39 changed its result without the aid of any specific statute
and now follows the weight of authority. Only Maine and Wisconsin have
adhered consistently to the view that general emancipation statutes have not
granted a married woman the right to bring such an action.
The Maine court seems to have had almost an obsession on the point,
and construed fairly direct and inclusive emancipation statutes as not giving
this right to a married woman, although they seemed to give her every other
kind of right.4 0 The legislature, however, did not share this obsession, and
has attempted to give to married women the specific right to maintain the
action for alienation of affection.
41
The Wisconsin court originally had to deal with a less specific emanci-
pation statute, so that it was not compelled to engage in such curious expe-
dients of statutory construction as was the Maine court. Nevertheless the
reasoning of the leading case in that state, Duffies v. Duffies,42 seems hardly
more commendable. The court's idea was that it would be impolitic to allow
the wife to bring such an action because the husband leads such an active
life that he is more likely to be seduced by designing women; that the wife
must expect this when she marries him; and accordingly that to permit her
to sue for such an evil would lead to overmuch litigation.
To comment upon this alleged reasoning would be impossible without
approaching contempt of court. Ofne is encouraged to note however that the
court later, after a statute had changed the rule, admitted its own absurdity,
saying that the statute did not result in the enormous increased legislation
prophesied in the Duffies case. 43  Even before the statute was passed, the
Wisconsin court did much to obviate the effects of its own rule (that the
wife could not bring such an action) by holding, somewhat illogically, that
IThis reasoning is fully set forth in Bennett v. Bennett, 1m6 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17
(1889) ; Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. I, 18 Atl. 1O27 (889).
"Sims v. Sims, 79 N. J. L. 577, 76 At. 1O63 (i9iO), holding that a wife may maintain
an action for the alienation of the affections of her husband, overruling in this respect the
contrary decision of Hodge v. Wetzler, 69 N. J. L. 490, 55 AtI. 49 (1903).
10Farrell v. Farrell, 118 Me. 441, iog Atl. 648 (192o); Howard v. Howard, 120 Me.
479, 115 Atl. 259 (1921). See adverse comment on this doctrine, especially as exemplified in
the case last cited, in Note (1922) 8 VA. L. REV. 370.
"Wilson v. Wilson, 115 Me. 341, 98 Atl. 938 (1916). But cf. Howard v. Howard, supra
note 4o, holding that since the statute gives the right to the wife only to sue another woman,
she has still no right to maintain the action against a male defendant.
76 Wis. 374, 45 N. W. 522 (1890).
"Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475 (1926). The statute does not give to the
wife the right to sue her husband for his own alienation, and so he should not be joined as a
party defendant. White v. White, 140 Wis. 538, 122 N. W. 1051 (199o).
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the wife could bring an action where there were several defendants who had
conspired to bring about the alienation of the husband's affections.44
The problem of the wife's right to sue is therefore no longer of practical
consequence.45  The only remaining problem results from the doctrine of
community property where that doctrine is accepted. Obviously if the dam-
ages become community property, which is usually under the husband's man-
agement, the power of the wife to sue is not of substantial advantage to her.
There are few decisions 4 and they appear to have dodged the point, although
under some community property statutes the problem appears to be some-
what troublesome.47  In some way or other, the result will probably be
reached that the amount recovered belongs to the wife's separate estate.
Defenses
The most obvious defense would be that the defendant was not respon-
sible for the alienation of affections of the plaintiff's spouse. Consequently
such responsibility must be proved by the plaintiff as a part of his case. 48
The defendant's active and successful interference in the marital relations
must be shown.49  Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
was the actual cause of the alienation and that the alienated spouse did not
act of his own volition. 50 If the defendant's activities, though resulting in
alienation, were justified by his business relations with the alienated spouse,
he is not liable.51
A rather special application of this doctrine frequently appears where
the wife is the plaintiff and is suing another woman for the alienation of
affections of her husband. Here it is frequently held that the burden on the
plaintiff is especially heavy since she must prove that the defendant was
active in persuading the alienated husband to withdraw his affections and
companionship from his wife, rather than, as is more frequently the case, a
mere passive recipient of his affections. 52  If the alienated husband is the
"Randall v. Lanstorf, 126 Wis. 147, 1O5 N. W. 663 (19o).
"Except possibly in Maine. See supra note 41.
'Beach v. Brown, 20 Wash. 266, 55 Pac. 46 (1898) ; Smith v. Womack, 271 S. W. 209
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ; Norris v. Stoneham, 46 S. W. (2d) 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
'See Note (1932) IO TEx. L. REv. 468.
1 Young v. Young, 8 Wash. 81, 35 Pac. 592 (1894) ; Scott v. O'Brien, 129 Ky. I, 110 S.
W. 260 (19o8) ; Bourne v. Bourne, 43 Cal. App. 516, 185 Pac. 489 (1919) ; Kadow v. Kadow,
195 Wis. 650, 219 N. W. 275 (1928).
" Hanor v. Housel, 128 App. Div. 8oi, 113 N. Y. Supp. 163 (19o8) ; Workman v. Work-
man, 43 Ind. App. 382, 85 N. E. 997 (igog).
' Eklund v. Hackett, io6 Wash. 287, 179 Pac. 803 (1919) ; Curtis v. Miller, 269 Pa. 509,
112 Atl. 747 (1921). The defendant is obviously not liable if the separation was the plain-
tiff's own fault. Annarina v. Boland, supra note 8; Oyler v. Fenner, 263 Mich. 119, 248 N.
W. 567 (1933).
Jennings v. Cooper, 230 S. W. 325 (Mo. App. 1921).
'Waldron v. Waldron, 45 Fed. 315 (C. C. N. D. Ill. I89O), rev'd on other grounds 156
U. S. 361, 15 Sup. Ct. 383 (1895) ; Loper v. Askin, 178 App. Div. 163, 164 N. Y. Supp. 1036
(1917) ; Stewart v. Hagerty, 251 Pa. 603, 96 Atl. lO99 (1916) ; Woodson v. Bailey, supra
note 30.
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pursuer rather than the pursued, the "other woman" is, of course, not liable,
at least in the case of alienation in the strict sense; it may be somewhat dif-
ferent when adultery is proved.53 But a woman defendant will not be
excused merely by reason of the fact that the plaintiff's husband was the
original aggressor if in fact she subsequently took active steps to alienate
him from his wife.5
On the other hand, the defendant is never liable unless he acts intention-
ally. Whatever may be the liability for negligent injuries to consortium, 55
this action does not have anything to do with them. The leading case on this
point is Lillegren v. Burns Detective Agency,"6 where the defendant was
employed by plaintiff (who suspected that his wife was unchaste) to shadow
her. The defendant shadowed the wrong woman. As a result, the plaintiff
falsely charged his wife with unchastity and she accordingly left him. He
sued the defendant for the alienation of her affections but failed, since the
defendant was merely negligent and did not intentionally interfere with the
marital relations.
So the defendant will not be held liable for derogatory statements con-
cerning the plaintiff unless it can be shown that the natural and intended
effect of such statements was to cause an alienation of affections. 57  Nor will
the defendant be held, at least in this form of action, for injurious acts
directed against the spouse of the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff's rights
of consortium are thus injured, unless it can be shown that such injury was
intended.58 The rule has its most obvious and perhaps most frequent appli-
cation where it is shown that the defendant did not know that the alienated
spouse was married.59 In such cases there can of course be no recovery,
since the injury to consortium was obviously not intentional. On the other
band mere lack of ill-will toward the plaintiff is not necessarily a defense;
if the defendant's acts were reasonably calculated to cause a substantial loss
of consortium to the plaintiff the defendant is liable irrespective of his feel-
ings toward the plaintiff.60
' Miller v. Pearce, supra note 19. But the better view is that if the woman defendant
though actively seduced by the plaintiff's husband, continues voluntarily to live with him in
adultery, she is liable to the plaintiff. Hart v. Knapp, supra note i5.
Norris v. Stoneham, supra note 46.
See Feneff v. New York, etc. R. R., 2o3 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436 (i9o9).
135 Minn. 6o, i6o N. W. 2o3 (1916). So, a wife will fail in an action against a club
which successfully tempted the plaintiff's husband to spend his time (and money) at the
gambling table rather than with the plaintiff, as this injury to the plaintiff was incidental and
could not be shown to have been intended. Anderson v. McGill Club, supra note I.
" Lynch v. Knight, supra note 34.
r3 Nieberg v. Cohen, 88 Vt. 281, 92 AtI. 214 (914) ; Bevers v. Bradstreet, 17o Ark. 65o,
280S. W. 667 (1926). See also Warner v. Miller, 17 Abb. N. C. 221 (N. Y. 1885).
rl Loper v. Askin, supra note 52; Madison v. Neuburger, 130 Misc. 650, 224 N. Y. Supp.
461 (1927) ; see Bresch v. Wolf, 243 Mich. 638, 22o N. W. 737 (928).
O' Eklund v. Hackett, supra note 50; Moelleur v. Moelleur, 55 Mont. 30, 173 Pac. 419
(i918) ; Hodge v. Brooks, 153 Ark. 222, 240 S. W. 2 (922).
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It appears, then, that the intended acts of the defendant must be a cause
of the loss of consortium in order that the plaintiff may receive redress, in
this sort of action. The problem still remains whether the defendant must
be the sole cause. The authorities seem unanimous in answering this ques-
tion in the negative. It is generally said that he must be the controlling
cause, 6 1 but if so, he is not excused by other contributory causes,62 even the
misconduct of the plaintiff himself.6 3 On the other hand a defendant can-
not be held liable merely because he had something to do with the aliena-
tion; " he must, as just pointed out, be the controlling cause, which would
seem to mean a substantial cause.
Where more than one defendant is joined, some of them are apt to make
the defense that they were not personally implicated in the acts complained
of. If the defendants are charged with conspiring to alienate the affections
of the plaintiff's spouse, the plaintiff obviously shows a good cause of action
against all defendants unless indeed the plaintiff himself is implicated in the
conspiracy. 65 If the conspiracy is proved, each defendant is liable for the
acts of all.66  If it is not proved, he may still be liable for his own acts if
they are a substantial cause of the alienation of the plaintiff's spouse.6 z
The problem of conspiracy frequently arises where a husband and wife
are defendants in an alienation suit. The most usual situation of this sort
is where they are the parents of the alienated spouse. Under these circum-
stances the father often seeks to avoid personal liability by disclaiming lia-
bility for the acts of the mother, who is usually the more active party in
bringing about the alienation. Of course, if the defendant husband is a
conspirator with his wife or others he is liable;6 but in the absence of such
conspiracy he is liable 69 only where there are still vestiges of a husband's
Hadley v. Heywood, 121 Mass. 236 (1876) ; Pugsley v. Smyth, 98 Ore. 448, 194 Pac.
686 (1921) ; Disch v. Closset, supra note 2o. In Maahs v. Schultz, 207 Wis. 624, 242 N. W.
195 (932), it was held reversible error to instruct the jury that the defendant was liable if
he was a controlling cause of the alienation; he must be the controlling cause. In Kleber v.
Allin, 153 Minn. 433, 19o N. W. 786 (1922), the defendant was held liable if he was the
"procuring cause" of the alienation.
Lundstrom v. Nelson, 114 Kan. 324, 219 Pac. 509 (1923) ; Rhodes v. Meloy, supra note
15; Sargent v. Robertson, 104 Vt. 412, 16o AtI. 182 (1932).
'Linden v. McClintock, 187 S. W. 82 (Mo. App. 1916).
' Larrabee v. Lynch, 105 N. J. L. 13, 143 Atl. 742 (1928).
Modica v. Martino, 211 App. Div. 516, 2o7 N. Y. Supp. 479 (1925).
'White v. White, supra note 43; Rockwell v. Rockwell, 181 Minn. 13, 231 N. W. 718
(193o) ; see also Randall v. Lanstorf, supra note 44. A release of one person from liability
for alienating the affections of the plaintiff's spouse does not release another person similarly
liable if he did not conspire with the person released. Henry v. Henry, 192 Iowa 1346, 186
N. W. 639 (1922).
01 Ratcliffe v. Walker, 117 Va. 569, 85 S. E. 575 (1915).
61 McAllister v. McAllister, 72 Colo. 28, 209 Pac. 788 (1922) ; Nelson v. Nelson, 296
Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
"Beem v. Beem, 193 Ind. 481, 141 N. E. 81 (1923) ; Pooley v. Dutton, 165 Iowa 745,
147 N. W. 154 (1914); Claxton v. Pool, 197 S. W. 349 (Mo. 1917); Burnett v. Cobb, 262
S. W. 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). Cf. Boland v. Stanley, supra note I.
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liability for the torts of his wife.-,° It is generally held that mere unfriend-
liness to the plaintiff and even actual unkindness to the plaintiff will not show
that the father-in-law entered into the conspiracy.71 It has even been held
that active approval of the activities of his wife does not show that the male
defendant conspired with her; 72 but it is certain that this comes very close
to entering the conspiracy and is likely to subject the unduly fond father to
liability to his son or daughter-in-law.7
The defense most frequently used is that based upon the privilege which
is given to parents and other close relatives of the alienated spouse. Under
this doctrine many activities of the relatives which would ordinarily subject
them to legal liability are held to be justified.
The privilege is perhaps most often applied in the case of parents, but it
should apply also to other near relatives.74 Thus brothers '5 and sisters 7 of
the alienated spouse are entitled to the same presumption in their favor. The
same applies to other blood relatives, 77 provided the relationship is not too
remote.7 8  It may include others than blood relatives. Thus, a guardian is
obviously entitled to the presumption, as he is essentially in a position of a
parent.7 9  Other persons in a relationship to the alienated spouse which is in
fact close though not one of blood, such as step-parents 80 and brothers- and
sisters-in-law, s are also ordinarily entitled to take advantage of this privi-
lege. In one old and rather peculiar case 82 a son-in-law was held entitled to
the privilege as a defense for the alleged alienation of the affections of his
mother-in-law. In another case it was indicated that a former fianc6 of the
' 0 Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23 (1884). In Burnett v. Cobb, supra note 69, it was held
that the husband of the female defendant who had "carried on" with the plaintiff's husband
should not be held to his common law liability for his wife's torts, in view of the fact that he
himself, as well as the plaintiff, was a victim of this tort.
"Heisler v. Heisler, 151 Iowa 503, 131 N. W. 676 (i91) ; Caplan v. Caplan, 83 N. H.
318, i42 AUt. 121 (1928).
" Caplan v. Caplan, supra note 71.
' Okrent v. Raffa, 2o6 Ky. 211, 266 S. W. io79 (1924).
7 See Note ANN. CAS. I917E IO27.
'tGlass v. Bennett, 89 Tenn. 478, 14 S. W. io85 (i89i) ; Allen v. Forsythe, 16o Mo. App.
262, i42 S. W. 820 (1912) ; Baird v. Carle, 157 Wis. 565, 147 N. W. 834 (914) ; Ratcliffe
v. Walker, supra note 67; Surbeck v. Surbeck, 208 S. W. 645 (Mo. App. i918) ; Harlow v.
Harlow, 152 Va. 910, 143 S. E. 72o (1928) ; Oyler v. Fenner, supra note 5o; see Cole v.
Johnson, io3 Ore. 319, 205 Pac. 282 (1922).
' Powell v. Benthall, 136 N. C. 145, 48 S. E. 598 (i9o4); Allen v. Forsythe; Harlow v.
Harlow, both supra note 75; Ratcliffe v. Walker, supra note 67; Smith v. Smith, 192 Mich.
566, 159 N. W. 349 (i916). Contra: Hollinghausen v. Ade, supra note 32, where however
the decision might better have been put on the ground that the defendant's acts exceeded the
privilege.
Cole v. Johnson, supra note 75 (aunt).
"'Weyer v. Vollbrecht, 208 Iowa 914, 224 N. W. 568 (i929).
"Trumbull v. Trumbull, 71 Neb. i86, 98 N. W. 683 (1904).
8 Brison v. McKellop, 41 Okla. 374, 138 Pac. 154 (1914) ; Townsend v. Holderby, i97
N. C. 550, 149 S. E. 855 (i929). Cf. Barbee v. Armstead, 32 N. C. 530 (1849).
a Powell v. Benthall, supra note 76. In Luick v. Arends, 21 N. D. 614, 132 N. W. 353
(1911), it is asserted that a brother-in-law is presumptively unjustified in interfering; but the
court admits that circumstances will often justify him.
2Turner v. Estes, 3 Mass. 317 (1807).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
alienated wife was entitled to the privilege, 3 though the soundness of this
ruling may well be doubted, as a former fianc6 is hardly justified in interfer-
ing with the marital rights of his successful rival. On the other hand it
would seem that an old family servant not in any way related to the alienated
spouse, but who had assisted in bringing him up, should have the same
privilege.8 4
The privilege, when it can be invoked by the defendant, operates so as
to enable him successfully to defend an action which would otherwise in all
probability be decided unfavorably to him. Sometimes the privilege merely
puts a greater burden of proof upon the plaintiff than otherwise would be
the case; 8" the presumption then operates primarily as a matter of evidence.
More often it results in the defendant's being excused notwithstanding the
fact that he is definitely proved to have done acts which aside from his rela-
tions to the alienated spouse would certainly make him legally liable for such
alienation."' The matter is well summarized by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine, as follows: 87
But it is universally conceded that a parent stands on dif-
ferent ground. Though the wife has gone out from the parental home,
and has joined her husband 'for better, for worse,' and though she owes
to him marital allegiance, and he possesses the first and the superior
right to her affection and comfort and society, it is nevertheless true
that the parental relation is not ended, nor has parental affection and
duty ended. . . . A parent may not with hostile, wicked or malicious
intent break up the relations between his daughter and her husband.
He may not do this simply because he is displeased with the marriage,
or because it was against his will, or because he wishes the marriage
relation to continue no longer. But a parent may advise his daughter,
in good faith, and for her good, to leave her husband, if he, on reason-
able grounds, believes that the further continuance of the marriage
relation tends to injure her health, or to destroy her peace of mind, so
that she would be justified in leaving him. A parent may, in such case,
persuade his daughter. He may use proper and reasonable arguments,
drawn, it may be, from his greater knowledge and wider experience.
Whether the motive was proper or improper is always to be considered.
Whether the persuasion or the argument is proper and reasonable, under
s Cole v. Johnson, supra note 75.
' See White v. White, supra note 43.
Gregg v. Gregg, supra note 5; Beem v. Beem, supra note 69; Cornelius v. Cornelius,
233 Mo. I, 135 S. W. 65 (1911) ; Hostetter v. Green, i5o Ky. 551, 150 S. W. 652 (912) ;
Cooper v. Cooper, Io2 Kan. 378, 171 Pac. 5 (i918) ; Schneider v. Tapfer, 92 Ore. 520, 1So
Pac. 107 (I919); Birchfield v. Birchfield, 29 N. M. 19, 217 Pac. 616 (Ig23); McLery v. Mc-
Lery, i86 Wis. I37, 2o2 N. W. i56 (i925); Miller v. Levine, 130 Me. 153, 154 Atl. 174
(1931) ; Noles v. Noles, 223 Ala. 554, 137 So. i9 (i93i). A statute permitting a wife to
bring an alienation suit does not, of course, remove this presumption in favor of parents.
Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 41. It has been pointed out that to hold parents because of
their greater opportunities to alienate the affections of their child would put them in a worse
situation than a stranger. Spiry v. Spiry, 47 S. D. 500, i99 N. W. 778 (1924).
' See the full discussion in Multer v. Knibbs, 193 Mass. 556, 79 N. E. 762 (i9o7).
Oakman v. Belden, 94 Me. 280, 282, 47 At1. 553 (900).
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the conditions presented to the parent's mind, is also always to be con-
sidered. It may turn out that the parent acted upon mistaken premises,
or upon false information, or his advice and his interference may have
been unfortunate; still, we repeat, if he acts in good faith, for the
daughter's good, upon reasonable grounds of belief, he is not liable to
the husband." SS
This presumption in favor of the parents and other relatives is undoubt-
edly the most important defense which can be raised in an alienation suit.
While, as indicated in the above quotation, it is more frequently applied when
the alienated spouse is the wife, yet it is also applicable where the wife brings
the suit for her husband's alienation. 89
It is not, however, a complete defense. An examination of the authori-
ties would probably show that more suits for alienation of affections are
brought against parents and other very close relatives of the alienated spouse
than against any other class of persons. As has been shown, the very rela-
tionship of parent and child justifies considerable interference even if the
child is married; but unlike the Roman law, our law does not give the
parents an absolute right to interfere. 90 They or other close relatives may
interfere almost to the limit so long as such interference is the result only of
consideration of the benefit of their child or other relative; but when. it is
dictated primarily by malice toward the spouse of that child the privilege
ceases and the liability is the same as that of a stranger.91 There are almost
innumerable cases where parents and other close relatives have been held
liable in this sort of suit, the court finding that there was sufficient evidence
to indicate malice toward the plaintiff on the part of the defendants so as to
justify a verdict in his favor, notwithstanding the favorable presumption to
which the defendants were entitled.92  The parents of one of the spouses are
not required to be pleasant to the other spouse 93 and a fortiori are not
s Among other important cases reaching the same result, and on similar reasoning, are
Kleist v. Breitung, 232 Fed. 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) ; Hutcheson v. Peck, 5 Johns. 196 (N.
Y. i8o9) ; Bennett v. Smith, 21 Barb. 439 (N. Y. 1856) ; Rabe v. Hanna, 5 Ohio 530 (1832) ;
Noll v. Carlin, iol Ore. 203, 199 Pac. 596 (1921) ; Beisel v. Gerlach, 221 Pa. 232, 70 Atl. 721
(19o8) ; Payne v. Williams, 4 Baxt. 583) (Tenn. 1874) ; Boland v. Stanley, supra note i;
Oyler v. Fenner, supra note 5o. Parents are not subjected to liability for unjustly though
honestly blaming their son's wife for his marital difficulties, when the son himself was really
to blame. Fronk v. Fronk 159 Mo. App. 543, 141 S. W. 692 (1911).
"Reed v. Reed, 6 Ind. App. 317, 33 N. E. 638 (1892) ; Melcher v. Melcher, lO2 Neb.
790, 169 N. W. 720 (i918). The defense need not be pleaded. Stephenson v. Stephenson,
213 Ala. 545, 105 So. 867 (1925).
0' Allen v. Forsythe, supra note 75.
" Holtz v. Dick, supra note 70; Multer v. Knibbs, supra note 86 (a strong statement of
the parents' privilege, but holding them liable because of their malice).
"- See cases cited supra note 91. See also Gross v. Gross, supra note 36; Ratcliffe v.
Walker, supra note 67; Francis v. Outlaw, 127 Md. 315, 96 Atl. 517 (916) ; Clark v. Clark,
187 Ind. 25, 118 N. E. 123 (1917) ; Jones v. Jones, 96 Wash. 172, 164 Pac. 757 (1917) ; Hope
v. Twarling, iii Neb. 793, 198 N. W. 161 (1924) ; Porter v. Porter, 258 S. W. 76 (Mo. App.
1924); Nelson v. Nelson, supra note 68; Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 99 Vt. 91, 130 At. 758
(1925).
" Smith v. Smith, supra note 76.
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required to permit that other spouse to live with them or to support him; 9'
but if the parent is actuated by malice toward his daughter's husband or his
son's wife his alienation of the affections of that child subjects him to lia-
bility. The situation is thus somewhat analogous to the qualified privilege
in libel and slander; 95 but the analogy is not perfect, at least with respect to
damages. 90
Here, as in many other branches of the law, the problem of the proper
definition of malice is a somewhat troublesome one. It is well known that
the courts have so treated this word as to make it mean practically anything-
or rather, nothing. In this case it has retained large traces of its original
meaning of spitefulness. It has been said that spite is not necessary, but
that malice involves an intentional wrong; 97 but under the circumstances of
this situation it would be hard to find an intentional wrong which was not
motivated at least in part by spitefulness, particularly as ill-treatment or
rudeness to the spouse of the child is regarded as relevant evidence of the
necessary malice. 98 Malice in this connection has also been defined as "a
wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse." 19 Disre-
garding the somewhat hypercritical suggestion which might be made that
this is the definition of a malicious act rather than of abstract malice, this
seems to amount to much the same as spitefulness; and this may also be
said of another court's definition of malice as "wrongful and unjustifiable
conduct", 100 since in applying this latter definition the parent would be jus-
tified and his conduct not wrongful unless it is actuated by ill-feeling to the
spouse of his child.' 0 ' On the whole, therefore, the plaintiff who sues the
parent or other close relative for alienation of affections of his spouse will
have little chance of success unless he can show reasonable evidence that the
defendant was actuated at least in some measure by ill-will toward the plain-
tiff himself; though it must be conceded that many cases have arisen where
such malice was found to have been proved, and probably rightly so.'1°
The privilege of parents and other near relatives is by no means confined
to a mere presumption in their favor. It is settled that they may do many
things which are unquestionably beyond the powers of strangers. For
SBeisel v. Gerlach, supra note 88.
See i BIsHoP, MAARAGE, DIvORCE AND SEPARATION (I89) § 1364.
Greuneich v. Greuneich, 23 N. D. 368, 137 N. W. 415 (912). See also Cornelius v.
Cornelius, supra note 85.
1 Westlake v. Westlake, sipra note 36; Wallace v. Wallace, 85 Mont. 492, 279 Pac. 374
(1929).
' Heisler v. Heisler, supra note 71; Lanigan v. Lanigan, supra note 25.
' Nelson v. Nelson, supra note 68, at 375. See also McAllister v. McAllister, supra
note 68.
'0 Shalit v. Shalit, 126 Me. 291, 138 Atl. 70 (1927).
10 Ramsey v. Ramsey, 34 Del. 576, 156 Atl. 354 (193). Cf. Allard v. LaPlain, supra
note 7. In Sargent v. Robertson, suprq note 62, it was held that a parent's malice must be
shown-but need not necessarily be "express malice".
"I' See cases cited supra notes 91 and 92.
ACTION FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS
example, parents may receive a married child into their home and may keep
him as long as he is willing to stay. 0 3 They must not keep him there against
his will,10 4 unless this becomes necessary because of the child's mental inca-
pacity to make this decision for himself.'0° They may, however, advise
their child against returning to his or her spouse.'0 They may go further,
and actually advise their child or other relative to leave his spouse and to
come to live with them.107  The only restriction on this is that the advice be
bona fide and not the result of ill feeling toward the other spouse. If it is
bona fide, the fact that the court may feel that it was ill advised or that it
was the result of misrepresentation made to the defendant by the alienated
spouse will not subject the defendant to any liability.'08 Nor is the fact
that the parent or other close relative has acted somewhat inconsiderately in
his dealings with the plaintiff sufficient of itself to subject him to liability. 10 9
It has been held, however, that parents may not threaten to disinherit a son
unless he leave his wife although they would have been justified in doing the
thing which they threaten to do.-"
In view of the well-settled presumption in favor of parents, which is a
matter of substantive law, it would appear that it is unnecessary for a
defendant parent to plead such presumption,"' though the rule may not be
the same with respect to other relatives relying upon the same presump-
tion.1 2 It has even been held that a complaint for alienation of affections is
defective if neither malice nor the relation of the plaintiff to the defendant is
alleged, since the defendant may have been a parent or other close relative of
that spouse and therefore entitled to the presumption in his favor."' It may
be questioned if this case does not go too far. On the other hand it has been
held that a parent is not entitled to the presumption in his favor unless he
claims it in his pleadings: "' a decision which seems to go too far in the
other direction. It indicates the desirability for a defendant who wishes to
take advantage of this defense of making his claim clear in his pleadings.
'Burnett v. Burkhead, 21 Ark. 77 (i86o) ; Powell v. Benthall, supra note 76; McGre-
gor v. McGregor, iis S. W. 8o2 (Ky. 19o9) ; Noll v. Carlin, supra note 88. They may also
take their child away from his spouse if the child requests it. Ray v. Parsons, 183 Ind. 344,
iog N. E. 202 (1915).
"DL Holtz v. Dick, supra note 70; Beisel v. Gerlach, suipra note 88; Lyen v. Lyen, 98 Wash.
498, 167 Pac. 1113 (1917) ; Lane v. Dunning, supra note i.
Horowitz v. Sacks, 89 Cal. App. 336, 265 Pac. 281 (1928).
Glass v. Bennett, supra note 75; Pooley v. Dutton, supra note 69.
'°
7 Rice v. Rice, 104 Mich. 371, 62 N. W. 833 (895).
Ray v. Parsons, supra note 103; Bourne v. Bourne, supra note 48.
103 McGregor v. McGregor, supra note 1O3; Bourne v. Bourne, supra note 48.
" Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, supra note 92.
Reed v. Reed, supra note 89; Baird v. Carle, supra note 75.
See Ruhs v. Ruhs, io5 Neb. 663, i8i N. W. 547 (1921).
Ellsworth v. Shimer, 71 Misc. 576, 128 N. Y. Supp. 883 (1911).
Doom v. Vinson, 196 Ky. 449, 244 S. W. 894 (1922).
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Assuming that the privilege of a parent or other near relative is properly
before the court, it is still not evidence in his behalf: 1 it merely increases
the burden upon the plaintiff by requiring him to prove malice or other
improper motive upon the part of the defendant, instead of merely proving
the latter's complicity in the alienation, which would be sufficient in the case
of a stranger. However, a charge to the jury which ignores the favorable
presumption accorded to a relative where the defendant is entitled to the
same, is reversible error.""I
One peculiar application of the favorable presumption accorded to a
parent in this sort of case is discussed in the case of Wolf v. Wolf." 7  Here
the alienated- spouse (a son) was under the statutory age for marriage.
Under the law of the state, his parents had a right to bring proceedings for
the annulment of the marriage. This they did, but only after they had per-
suaded the son to leave his wife. The latter sued her former parents-in-law
for the alienation of his affections. The lower court held that she was en-
titled to recover; that the marriage though voidable was valid until actually
annulled and that until the decree of annulment the parents had no right to
alienate the son's affections from his wife. This would appear to be the
correct view, but the decision was reversed,"18 because the upper court felt
that the rights of the defendants to annul the marriage included a right to
alienate their son's affections prior to the annulment. It is submitted that
this is giving the parents an unnecessary and therefore improper privilege. 119
At any rate, it seems clear that the sub-statutory age for marriage of their
child would give the parents no right to alienate his affections in jurisdictions
where they have no right to annul his marriage.
The presumption in favor of a parent or other close relative necessarily
involves a lack of such presumption in favor of any one else; and in fact it
is generally held that the presumption is strongly against a stranger. 20 No
doubt a stranger is justified in sheltering a wife who is driven away from
home by the cruelty of her husband,' 2 ' but this is about as far as he can go.
The matter is well stated by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Modisett v.
McPike,12 2 as follows:
". .. The wife may have a just cause for separation or divorce,
but she may elect to abide by her situation, and remain with her husband
nevertheless. If she chooses to do so, no stranger has the right to inter-
n'Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, mipra note 92, the court stating that the presumption is
merely "locative".
"' Greuneich v. Greuneich, supra note 96.
"' iM Misc. 391, 181 N. Y. Supp. 368 (I92o).
= 194 App. Div. 33, 185 N. Y. Supp. 37 (920).
n See (92) 30 YALE L. J. 527.
' Smith v. Mitchell, 64 Cal. App. 463, 221 Pac. 964 (923) ; Rose v. Dean, 192 N. C.
556, i35 S. E. 348 (1926) ; Alexander v. Johnson, 182 Ark. 270, 31 S. W. (2d) 304 (1930).
Berthon v. Cartwright, 2 Esp. 480 (Eng. 1796). But a stranger may probably assist
a wife to leave a cruel husband, if she requests it. See Ray v. Parsons, supra note 103.
'-74 Mo. 636, 646 (i88i).
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meddle with the domestic and marital relations of husband and wife,
and if he voluntarily does so he is amenable for the consequences. If,
on the contrary, the wife having just cause for the separation or for
obtaining a divorce from her husband, voluntarily seeks the advice,
shelter and protection of a relative, or even a stranger, then a different
rule obtains. In such a case the wife has the unquestioned right to seek
and accept the advice and protection of a relative or stranger from the
intolerable abuse and wrongs of her husband. And in such case, also,
such relative or stranger so affording such protection or advice to the
wife, is not answerable to the husband for such conduct, if he acts in
good faith and from motives of kindness and humanity. No one un-
asked, especially a stranger, has the right to volunteer his advice or
protection, and if he does so he is amenable." 123
The stranger may possibly justify his interference by showing that it
is fairly incidental to some business or social relationship with the alienated
spouse, as for example by the fact that it is incident to his employment of
such spouse; 124 but this is a defense the proving of which is an affirmative
burden on the defendant-it need not be negatived by the plaintiff.12 5 There
are some authorities who talk about the necessity of the proof of malice on
the defendant's part even when he is a stranger; 126 this is only another proof
of the practical worthlessness of the word "malice" in this connection, since
the burden is met by proof that the defendant acted intentionally and without
apparent justification. So much must, of course, be proved by the plaintiff
in any case. The better rule is that malice on the part of a stranger need
neither be alleged nor proved, and that his motive is immaterial. 127
Another entirely separate defense, which may be available to any defend-
ant in an alienation suit, is that the spouses had no affection for each other
prior to the defendant's interference. Since the gist of the action is loss of
consortium rather than mere loss of affections, this would seem not to be
necessarily a bar; yet it must be admitted that rights of consortium with a
spouse who has no affection whatever are obviously worth very little. It may
therefore be urged reasonably that to allow the prosecution of an alienation
action in such circumstances is undesirable ;128 and there are several author-
ities so holding.129 Even in these jurisdictions, however, punitive damages
have been granted in aggravated cases, although no substantial damages
appeared because of the almost total lack of affection between the spouses.' 30
See also Hartpence v. Rogers, 143 Mo. 623, 45 S. W. 650 (1898).
"' Jennings v. Cooper, supra note 51.
Ibid.
-Rose v. Dean; Alexander v. Johnson, both supra note 120.
Grilnberger v. Brotherton, 22 P. (2d) 983 (Wash. 1933).
See HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 256.
Servis v. Servis, 172 N. Y. 438, 65 N. E. 270 (i9o2) ; Madison v. Neuburger, supra
note 59; McGregor v. McGregor, supra note 103.
SButeau v. Naegeli, 124 Misc. 470, 2o8 N. Y. Supp. 504 (1925), re7'd, 216 App. Div.
833, 215 N. Y. Supp. 823 (1926).
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The weight of authority seems to be to the contrary-that is to say,
that total lack of affection between the spouses is not a bar to liability of the
defendant for subsequent interference. 31 The theory of these courts is that
the plaintiff should not be deprived of the chance, whatever it may be worth,
of subsequently effecting a reconciliation with his spouse.
It is easy to exaggerate the significance of this division of opinion. All
courts would probably agree that a substantial lack of affection between the
spouses, even though not wholly complete, may be shown in mitigation of
damages. 13 2  Furthermore there is a well settled rule that the spouses will
always be presumed to have had some affection prior to the defendant's inter-
ference.133  The result is that even where a complete lack of affection is a
bar to the action, the defendant has the burden of showing this; and such a
burden is apt to be heavy.
Besides all this it is entirely clear that the defendant is liable in practi-
cally all jurisdictions if he prevents reconciliation between the spouses even
though the relationships between them are somewhat strained. Even Massa-
chusetts 134 admits this, the court saying:
"... _Any unhappy relations existing between the plaintiff and
wife, not caused by the conduct of the defendant, may affect the ques-
tion of damages, and were properly submitted to the jury; but they are
in no sense a justification or palliation of the defendant's conduct. They
are not allowed to affect the damages because the acts of the defendant
are less reprehensible, but because the condition of the husband is such,
that the injury, which such acts occasion, is less than otherwise it might
have been." 135
The rule is not affected by the fact that the relationships are extremely
strained and that the quarrels between the spouses are somewhat violent, so
long as there is even a vestige of affection between them;' 30 and as already
shown, this last is presumed. Even though the spouses have actually sepa-
rated before the defendant interfered he may still be liable. This is obviously
true if the spouses both desire to become reconciled;' 37 it likewise applies
IDey v. Dey, 94 N. J. L. 342, 110 Atl. 703 (192o) ; Halpern v. Mendel, Iio N. J. L.
552, 166 Atl. 172 (i933) ; Olsen v. Erickson, I52 Wash. 633, 278 Pac. 692 (i929) ; Rash v.
Pratt, 31 Del. I8, iii Atl. 225 (192o) ; Sargent v. Robertson, supra note 62.
'Payne v. Williams, supra note 88; Moelleur v. Moelleur, supra note 6o; Beem v.
Beem, supra note 69; Okrent v. Raffa, supra note 73; Alex v. Strickland, supra note i8;
Amellin v. Leone, 114 Conn. 478, 159 Atl. 293 (932).
' Beach v. Brown, supra note 46; Gregg v. Gregg, supra note 5; Annarina v. Boland,
supra note 8; Overton v. Overton, 121 Okla. 1, 246 Pac. io95 (1926) ; Weyer v. Vollbrecht,
supra note 78; Buckley v. Francis, 78 Utah 6o6, 6 P. (2d) 188 (i93i).
Hadley v. Heywood, supra note 6x.
Id. at 239.
'Johnson v. Allen, ioo N. C. I3I, 5 S. E. 666 (1888) ; Philpott v. Kirkpatrick, i7i Mich.
495, 137 N. W. 232 (1912) ; Scott v. Bontekoe, 252 Mich. 185, 233 N. W. 215 (i93o) ; Joseph
v. Naylor, supra note 15; Bradbury v. Brooks, supra note 13. The same is true if the par-
ties were already so estranged that they later obtained a divorce. Munson v. Solace, 66
Mont. 70, 212 Pac. 11o3 (923).
' Hollinghausen v. Ade, supra note 32.
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even though no such desire appears on the part of the alienated spouse, since
there is always a chance of reconciliation. 38 The separation does not prove
that there may not be some latent affection still existing between the
spouses,139 though it has been held that the defendant is not liable if he can
prove affirmatively that no reconciliation was reasonably possible.140
With all these difficulties in the way of a defendant seeking to make use
of this defense it seems clear that the lack of affection between the spouses,
even if regarded as a bar to the action, is not ordinarily a particularly valuable
defense except as a matter of mitigation of damages; this use of it is possible
in all jurisdictions.
Another defense which is frequently set up is that the spouses have been
divorced or otherwise permanently separated. Here too the defense almost
invariably fails to present an absolute bar to the action,141 though it will
often be considered as a basis for mitigation of damages. That the divorce
was obtained by the alienated spouse through the fault of the plaintiff in the
alienation action does not necessarily preclude him from relief,142 since as
already pointed out, the alienated spouse, though having grounds for divorce,
might well not have obtained it had it not been for the defendant's interfer-
ence.' 43  The fact that the alienated spouse after the divorce marries the
defendant obviously will not improve the position of the latter in the aliena-
tion action.144  Even more clearly a divorce obtained by the plaintiff because
of the fault of the alienated spouse does not bar the action, since that fault of
the alienated spouse is presumably at least partly due to the defendant's
unjustified interference. 145  Nor does the fact that the plaintiff in the aliena-
tion suit (the wife) secured alimony from her husband bar the suit: 14' the
alimony does not compensate her for the defendant's wrong, since it does not
restore her right of consortium with her husband. It need scarcely be added
that if the alienated spouse has failed in an attempt to secure a divorce from
the plaintiff this cannot help the defendant 147except possibly as evidence of
previous lack of affection between the spouses.
' Porter v. Porter, supra note 92; Amellin v. Leone, supra note 132. See also Daven-
port v. Holden, 95 N. J. L. 197, 112 Atl. 418 (1920).
Morris v. Warwick, 42 Wash. 480, 85 Pac. 42 (i9o6).
'°Rush v. Buckles, 93 W. Va. 493, 117 S. E. 130 (1923).
"'' See Note (1922) 2o A. L. R. 936. See also Sickler v. Mannix, 68 Neb. 21, 93 N. W.
Xo18 (903) ; Luick v. Arends, supra note 81.
"" Dunbier v. Mengedoht, i19 Neb. 706, 23o N. W. 669 (193o). See also Knickerbocker
v. Worthing, 138 Mich. 224, IO N. W. 540 (19o4); Eklund v. Hackett, szpra note 5o;
Lundstrom v. Nelson, supra note 62.
'-c Philpott v. Kirkpatrick, supra note 136; Pollard v. Ward, 289 Mo. 275, 233 S. W.
14 (1921).
'"Keen v. Keen, supra note 36.
'"Luick v. Arends, supra note 81.
' Hope v. Twarling, supra note 92; Case v. Case, 212 Iowa 1213, 238 N. W. 85 (1931).
17 Cole v. Johnson, supra note 75.
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Since divorce is no bar to the alienation action, a like rule applies to a
judicial separation. 148 The same is true with respect to an actual separation
without judicial proceedings either when the alienated spouse deserts the
plaintiff 149 or when the plaintiff leaves his spouse as a result of the fault of
the latter.1 0  A contract between the spouses by which each gives up all
rights against the other would seem to be no bar to the alienation suit since
the plaintiff does not thereby give up his rights, if any, against the defendant,
who is not a party to the agreement.'51 By the same token a separation
agreement between the spouses is no bar to an alienation suit, 1 2 as the de-
fendant is not a party to the agreement; furthermore the defefldant is pre-
sumably responsible for the estrangement between the spouses which led to
the separation agreement.
Nor is the stiit necessarily barred by the fact that the spouses have not
separated and have continued to cohabit.1583 This may make it difficult to
show a loss of consortium, and in any event is likely to mitigate damages;
but if a substantial loss of consortium, even though only partial, 54 can be
proved as a result of the defendant's unjustified interference, the continued
cohabitation of the plaintiff with the alienated spouse is not a bar to the
action. Even more clearly, the resumption of cohabitation by the spouses,
if the previous separation was the defendant's fault, does not preclude an
alienation action.'35 It may be said that under these circumstances the plain-
tiff has reclaimed his rights of consortium but is still entitled to a remedy
against the defendant for the temporary deprivation thereof.'56
There is one jurisdiction which takes the opposite view with respect to
divorce. This is Iowa, which holds that a divorce of the spouses precludes
an action for alienation of affections. 157  The holding seems hardly justifi-
able, for the reasons already set forth, but the opinion is predicated upon a
statute providing that "when a divorce is decreed the guilty party forfeits
all rights acquired by the marriage." It is believed that the statute has been
given too broad a construction by the court ;'58 but in any case its very exist-
ence effectively prevents the Iowa doctrine from being regarded as authority
in any other jurisdiction.
' Wilson v. Coulter, 29 App. Div. 85, 51 N. Y. Supp. 804 (1898).
", Hollinghausen v. Ade, supra note 32.
Callis v. Merrieweather, 98 Md. 361, 57 Atl. 201 (19o4) ; Surbeck v. Surbeck, supra
note 75.
'15 Jenness v. Simpson, supra note i.
I Annarina v. Boland, supra note 8; Patterson v. Hill, 212 Mich. 635, i8o N. W. 352
(Ig2o). See also Johnson v. Richards, supra note 8.
IHeermance v. James, 47 Barb. 120 (N. Y. I866) ; Rinehart v. Bills, 82 Mo. 534 (1884);
Foot v. Card, supra note 38.
Murrell v. Culver, supra note 9.
Peak v. Rhyno, 200 Iowa 864, 2o5 N. W. 515 (1925) ; Lavigne v. Lavigne, 8o N. H.
559, 119 Atl. 869 (r923).
156 Lavigne v. Lavigne, supra note 155.
"L7Duff v. Henderson, 191 Iowa 819, 183 N. W. 475 (1921). The ruling applies only to
divorce and not to separation. Peak v. Rhyno, supra note 155.
""See Note (igi) ii CoT. L. REV. 367.
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Another plea of justification quite frequently resorted to by defendants
in this sort of action is the effect of religious differences between the spouses.
Obviously this is quite closely tied up with certain more general defenses,
especially the privilege of a parent or other close relative. It is clearly settled
that such religious differences do not of themselves justify intentional alien-
ation." It has even been held that they do not justify a parent in interfer-
ing.160 It is submitted, however, that such religious differences between the
spouses may influence a parent to believe that the continuance of the marital
relationship is undesirable: the parent or other close relative should be
entitled to show such religious differences on the issue of his good faith.16 1
A final defense which requires consideration is the statute of limitations.
This involves two problems: first, under what statute of limitations is the
action to be put; and secondly, when does the cause of action become com-
plete? The first problem is primarily one involving construction of the stat-
utes of the particular jurisdiction involved, plus a determination of the
nature of the action. No doubt the action is in substance for a personal
tort, but it would not follow that the statute of limitations governing such
tort (for which the statutory period is usually very short) would apply.1" '
It would appear that either statutes governing actions to redress injuries to
property rights or else a general catch-all statute should be applied,0 3 in the
absence of explicit provision for alienation suits.
The problem of the accrument of the cause of action is still more
difficult. Obviously the statutory period does not commence to run until
the alienation is complete; and this may become a jury question.'0 4 At any
rate, acts of the defendant committed prior to the beginning of the statutory
period can be shown, since alienation of affections is obviously a somewhat
continuous process and may take some time."6 5
If, however, the parties actually separate, the cause of action presum-
ably accrues on the date of separation and the statutory period commences to
run at that time. 60 When the parties separate, it is reasonably clear that
the defendant has been successful in his effort to alienate the affections of
one of the spouses from the other; but if there is a chance of reconciliation
after the separation and the defendant then prevents such reconciliation from
materializing, it may well be that there is a new cause of action for alienation,
'1; Mohn v. Tingley, supra note 29. See Hughes v. Holman, 1io Ore. 415, 223 Pac. 730(1924).
110 Harlow v. Harlow, supra note 75; Wallace v. Wallace, .supra note 97.
Rice v. Rice, supra note 107.
inGernerd v. Gernerd, I85 Pa. 233, 39 At. 884 (i898).
' See Crane v. Ketcham, supra note 7.
'* Smith v. Lyon, 9 Ohio App. 141 (i918).
' Davis v. Butler, i98 K y. 795, 250 S. W. 126 (923); Boyd v. Strickland, 237 N. W.729 (S. D. 193).
Gooch v. Gooch, 112 Kan. 592, 211 Pac. 621 (923); Brown v. Brown, supra note z;
Overton v. Overton, supra note 133.
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and if so, the statute of limitations as to it will of course run only from this
subsequent period.'1 7  However, if the alienation has clearly been accom-
plished, the statutory period may begin to run even though the spouses have
not yet separated.'01  And it seems that the plaintiff's laches may preclude
him from beginning such a suit though the statute of limitations has not
run.169
Evidence
The problem of evidence in actions for the alienation of affections has
obvious similarities to that for other sorts of litigation and hence need not
be discussed at detail. It may be said in general that the tendency of the
courts seems to be toward greater liberality in this sort of action than in
most other kinds.. °  However, no attempt will be made to discuss any
topics of evidence except a few, which seem to be somewhat peculiar with
respect to this action.
It is clear that circumstantial evidence has large scope here. It is fre-
quently relied on in large part by the plaintiff in establishing his case. 7 '
This is necessary because the defendant's activities are often somewhat secret,
especially so far as the innocent spouse is concerned. Indirect evidence of
alienation is all that is available in many cases. 172 This liberal treatment of the
plaintiff is also extended to the defendant where it is at least as necessary.
So evidence, either direct or indirect, which tends reasonably toward possible
mitigation of damages is admissible. 173  This may include evidence contra-
dicting the plaintiff's present testimony which, if it has no other value to
the defendant, would at least tend to show that the plaintiff has not in fact
been injured as much as he presently claims' 7 4 The defendant may also
show circumstantial evidence which will substantiate any defense which he
makes-as for example that the alienation was the result solely of the volition
of the alienated spouse 175 or of some other cause with which the defendant
had nothing to do.' 7 '
See Farneman v. Farneman, 46 Ind. App. 453, 90 N. E. 775 (191o).
' Pray v. Millett, 122 Me. 40, ii8 Atl. 721 (1922). See also French v. Deane, 19 Colo.
504, 36 Pac. 6o9 (1894).
_ Churchill v. Lewis, 17 Abb. N. C. 226 (N. Y. 1886).
'7' See 13 R. C. L. 1475.
'r Wilson v. Coulter, supra note 148; Hardwick v. Hardwick, 130 Iowa 230, lo6 N. W.
639 (19o6) ; Fuller v. Robinson, 230 Mo. 22, 130 S. W. 343 (igio); Belt v. Belt, 288 S. W.
ioo (Mo. App. 1926).
'' Doom v. Vinson, supra note 114.
'17 Hardwick v. Hardwick, supra note 171; Annarina v. Boland, supra note 8; Murrell v.
Culver, supra note 9; Helminiak v. Przekurat, 184 Wis. 417, ig8 N. W. 746 (1924) ; Shalit
v. Shalit, supra note IOO.
': Bassett v. Bassett, 20 Ill. App. 543 (1886) ; Johnson v. Richards, supra note 8.
""Harper v. Harper, 252 Fed. 39 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918) ; Bassett v. Bassett, supra note
174. 1LT Rudd v. Rounds, 64 Vt. 432, 25 Atl. 438 (1892). See also Strock v. Russell, 148 App.
Div. 483, 132 N. Y. Supp. 968 (1911).
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The most frequent employment of circumstantial evidence in alienation
cases is in connection with the issue of malice when the defendant is entitled
to the privilege of a near relative. It is clear that malice, here in the proper
sense of spitefulness, can rarely be proved except by circumstantial evidence;
accordingly such evidence is admissible. 177 Evidence may be pertinent as
tending to show the malice of the defendant even though it consists of his
refusal to do something which he was not legally bound to do; 178 for such
refusal, even though legally justified, may under the circumstances show
ill-will toward the plaintiff.
The general problem of the declarations of persons interested in the
action is also treated liberally by the courts. In general, declarations of the
defendant are admissible against him. 179 This is particularly true when the
declarations were made to the alienated spouse, and presumably influenced
the action of the latter even though they cannot be considered a part of the
alienation itself. Such declarations are admissible on the issue of the mental
state of the defendant.'80 Thus a letter by the defendant to his son then
married to the plaintiff and containing such declarations may be admitted
though the letter was intercepted by the plaintiff and never reached her
husband.""
Declarations of the defendant may in some circumstances be admissible
in his favor. The obvious objection to admitting such declarations is that
they are self-serving. This objection has not, however, been regarded as
conclusive by most courts,' 8 2 though the self-serving quality would no doubt
affect the weight of such evidence.
When we turn to the problem of declarations by the alienated spouse,
the problem is even more complicated. That spouse is not a party to the
action, although he generally is in fact supporting the defendant. There
appears, therefore, to be no problem of privilege involved here,'8 3 but there
is a problem of pertinency.
Probably the weight of authority permits such declarations to be intro-
duced where they tend to show the feelings of the alienated spouse toward
In Cornelius v. Cornelius, supra note 85; Hayward v. Ham, 29 S. W. (2d) 243 (Mo.
App. 1930), rez'd on other grounds in 51 S. W. (2d) 79 (1932) ; Stilwell v. Stilwell, 186
Iowa 177, 172 N. W. 177 (1919) ; Wallace v. Wallace, supra note 97.
8 Jackson v. Jackson, 35 S. W. (2d) 83o (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). See also Cornelius v.
Cornelius, supra note 85.
- Price v. Price, supra note 36; Caplan v. Caplan, supra note 71. If the declarations are
self-serving, they are not so likely to be admitted. Murphy v. Willumsen, 224 Ill. App. 425
(1922).
" Bourne v. Bourne, supra note 48; Stilwell v. Stilwell, supra note 177.
m Mercer v. Parsons, 95 N. J. L. 224, 112 Atl. 254 (192o). Verbal evidence of the con-
tents of a letter from the defendant to his son, the alienated spouse, can be given, if the letter
has been destroyed. Bresch v. Wolf, supra note 59.
'= Scott v. O'Brien, supra note 48; Noll v. Carlin, supra note 88.
See 3 WItoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1730; 4 Id. § 2239.
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the other spouse, such feelings being of course a pertinent issue in the case.' 8 4
Such admission of declarations showing the feeling of the declarant toward
his spouse does not, however, of itself permit statements showing the reason
for such feelings.' 8 5
Many courts go further and permit such declarations to show the effect
on the declarant of the defendant's actions. 80 Obviously such actions can-
not be shown by such testimony; they must be proved independently. 87
These courts permit evidence of declarations by the alienated spouse to indi-
cate the effect upon him of what the defendant is otherwise proved to have
done. Such evidence may also be used to justify the defendant as well as to
hold him.'
Another theory upon which courts admit the declarations of alienated
spouses is under an application of the somewhat dubious res geste theory-
that such actions characterize an act of the declarant and are admissible for
that purpose. Thus declarations by a wife at or immediately after the time
when she separates from her husband that such separation was caused by
his cruelty are admissible against him if he brings suit against those who
assisted her to escape.'8 9 Declarations of this sort may be admissible in
favor of either party.0'0 Here too it must be noted that the declarations are
not to be regarded as evidence of the facts asserted, but only as evidence of
the reasons actuating the alienated spouse in separating. 19 1 So far as is pos-
sible, the declarations should be segregated into those testifying to the acts
of one of the parties to the suit and those describing the effect of those acts
upon the declarant. Only the latter type of declaration should be admitted.19 2
Notwithstanding all this, there are several jurisdictions where such
declarations of the alienated spouse seem generally to be excluded unless
made in the presence of the party against whom the evidence is to be directed.
In some cases this ruling is justifiable, since the declarations have little effect
except to show the actions of that party, and declarations are not admissible
I Boland v. Stanley, supra note i ; McKenzie v. Lautenschlager, 113 Mich i7i, 7I N. W.
489 (1897); Warren v. Graham, 174 Iowa 162, I56 N. W. 323 (1916); Pugsley v. Smyth,
supra note 6i; Coates v. Slusher, io9 Ore. 612, 222 Pac. 311 (1924) ; Trenerry v. Fravel, Io
F. (2d) IoII (App. D. C. 1926).
mLuick v. Arends, supra note 8i.
"a Rudd v. Rounds, supra note 176; Allen v. Forsythe; Baird v. Carle, both supra note
75.
" Willey v. Howell, i68 Ky. 466, 182 S. W. 619 (I916).
Ibid.
Gilchrist v. Bale, 8 Watts 355 (Pa. 1839) ; Baker v. Baker, i6 Abb. N. C. 293 (N. Y.
1885). Contra: Bathke v. Krassin, 82 Minn. 226, 84 N. W. 796 (igoi). But such declara-
tions are admissible only if considered strictly a part of the res gesta. Higham v. Vanosdol,
ioi Ind. I6o (1884) ; Mumper v. Webster, 137 Ore. 554, 3 P. (2d) 753 (I93i).
'o Glass v. Bennett, supra note 75.
See the excellent discussion on this point in Murray v. Murray, 3o N. M. 557, 246
Pac. 303 (925).
Johnson v. Richards, supra note 8.
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for that purpose. 19 3 A few authorities lay down flatly the rule that no dec-
larations of the alienated spouse are admissible unless the defendant was
present. 19 4  Most courts, however, will admit such declarations if they have
any pertinency as showing the state of affections of the declarant to his
spouse or the effect upon him of the defendant's actions;'19 and practically
all jurisdictions will allow such declarations in so far as they are regarded
as within the scope of the res gestce rule.' 90
The most difficult problem with respect to evidence still remains for
consideration. This is the problem of evidence of communications between
the spouses and, as subordinate thereto, the competency of one spouse to
testify against the other in an alienation suit. The problem in both of these
situations is one of privilege. The purpose of privilege is to preserve the
sanctity of the marital relations-a worthy purpose, which, however, seems
not particularly applicable to a situation where the spouses are so estranged
that one of them institutes an alienation suit. 197  Nevertheless, the privilege
is still given considerable effect in this sort of case.
Rules enforcing the incapacity of one spouse to testify against the other
seem to be applicable in alienation suits even though the spouse seeking to
testify is not generally a party to the case.'9 8 He is in fact testifying against
his spouse, the plaintiff in the alienation action. A statute permitting one
spouse to testify against another in an action between them has been held
not to permit such testimony in an alienation action where both spouses are
not parties.' 99 Some jurisdictions have statutes permitting such testimony
in a pure alienation suit; but the statute is held not to apply when adultery is
charged. 200 Testimony by his spouse in rebuttal of the plaintiff's testimony
is regarded as testimony against him and will therefore be excluded under
this rule ;201 although under some statutes there appears to be a difference
as to whether the testifying party is a husband or a wife.
20 2
It is submitted that this situation should be clarified by a general statute
permitting either spouse to testify generally in alienation actions. Until
such a statute is passed, such absurd and often unjust technicalities will
clutter our law.
Passing to the more important subject of testimony concerning commu-
nications between the spouses, it must first be noted that there is frequently
113Moir v. Moir, 181 Iowa lOO5, 165 N. W. 221 (1917) ; Davis v. Butler, supra note 165;
Spiry v. Spiry, supra note 85.
" Westlake v. Westlake, supra note 36; Manwarren v. Mason, 79 Hun 592, 29 N. Y.
Supp. 915 (1894) : Kreager v. Kreager, 192 Ind. 242, 135 N. E. 66o (1922).
10 See cases supra notes 186-188.
21" See cases supra notes i89-io.
z See WIGMORE, 10C. Cit. supra note 183. See also Note (919) 4 A. L. R. 497.
'a See 13 R. C. L. 1480. See also Fratini v. Caslini, 66 Vt. 273, 29 Ati. 252 (1894).
__ Huot v. Wise, 27 Minn. 68, 6 N. W. 425 (I88o) ; Lyen v. Lyen, supra note 104.
- Knickerbocker v. Worthing, supra note 142.
0 Rice v. Rice, supra note Io7.
See McGinnis v. McGlothlan, 192 Mo. App. 141, 18o S. W. 405 (1915).
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the same problem of proving the communications. If the spouse of the
plaintiff is to testify to them, he may be excluded under the rule that he can-
not testify against his spouse.20 3 However, there are frequently means of
avoiding the rule. It may be that the testimony will be favorable to his
spouse; the testimony respecting the communications may be given by the
plaintiff himself; or there is the possibility that the communications are in
some permanent form, like letters which obviate the necessity of any substan-
tial verbal testimony. In all this we still have the rather artificial but dis-
tinctly knotty problem of the violation of the marital relations.
Perhaps because letters are not subject to the frailties of human recollec-
tion and perhaps also because it is thought that the marital relation is less
affected by such evidence, the general tendency is to admit pertinent letters
between the spouses. 20 4 Even though the letters were written after the sepa-
ration, they may still be admitted, though probably carrying less weight.20 5
Here again only those parts of the letters which are pertinent should be
read to the jury; so far as is possible mere allegations of the defendant's
alleged wrongdoing should be omitted.2 0 6  Letters containing a mere narra-
tive of the defendant's acts 207 or objectionable for other reasons 208 should,
of course, be excluded.
The subject of verbal communications between the spouses is compli-
cated not only by the predisposition of the courts to frown upon such testi-
mony but also, in some cases, by statutes. Some statutes appear to exclude
all evidence of such declarations for any purpose.2 0 9  The Kentucky court
has gone so far as to hold that the husband's indifferent treatment of his wife
cannot be testified to by her in an alienation suit which she brought, on the
ground that such indifferent treatment is itself a communication to the wife
falling within the prohibition of the statute.210  Probably no other court
would carry the statutory rule to this absurd extent, but most of them con-
strue the statutes with at least considerable-and it seems, undesirable-
See Knickerbocker v. Worthing, supra note 142.
' Beach v. Brown, supra note 46; Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N. C. 426, 02 S. E. 769
(ig2o) ; Disch v. Closset, supra note 2o; Rockwell v. Rockwell, supra note 66. A letter writ-
ten by the alienated spouse to the defendant is not to be regarded as a communication between
the spouses, even though written in the presence of the plaintiff. Weston v. Weston, 86 App.
Div. 159, 83 N. Y. Supp. 528 (19o3). The letter is, however, admissible as a declaration of
the alienated spouse. Ibid.
'Freund v. Freund, 8 N. J. Misc. 675, 151 AtI. 375 (1930).
*Ash v. Prunier, 105 Fed. 722 (C. C. A. 2d, 19O1).
Bevers v. Bradstreet, supra note 58.
Rasanen v. Viinamaki, 103 Vt. 323, 154 Atl. 691 (1931).
'Watkins v. Lord, supra note ii; Kreager v. Kreager, supra note 194; Gjesdabl v.
Harmon, 175 Minn. 414, 221 N. W. 639 (1928).
m.Allcock v. Allcock, 174 Ky. 665, 192 S. W. 853 (1917). This decision seems contrary
to the decision of the same court the previous year in Merritt v. Cravens, supra note 9. Tes-
timony of acts is not testimony as to declarations. Brister v. Dunaway, 149 Miss. 5, 115 So.
36 (1928).
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rigidity.211 The Utah court has admitted that its statute may be "barbaric",
but says it must be literally followed anyway.2
12
One or two courts have taken what seems to be a more sensible view:
they have held that the statute is directed only at privileged communications
--which would seem to mean communications the disclosure of which would
have a disturbing effect upon the stability of the marriage. 2' 3 Non-privileged
communications are said by the Nebraska court to be possibly within the
letter but certainly not within the spirit of the statute.2 14  This is a highly
desirable point of view, though it must be confessed that it makes the statutes
of comparatively little effect.
In the absence of a statute pertaining to communications between
spouses, many courts admit such evidence to show the feelings of the spouses
toward each other. 215  This seems quite unobjectionable, since such com-
munications would not necessarily make any reference to the defendant or be
influenced by him. 16 It has been suggested that such declarations made by
the alienated wife to her husband who brings the suit are not within the
hearsay rule at all.21 1 This is probably incorrect, but it seems that such
declarations are within the exception to the hearsay rule relating to feelings
and intentions.
Many courts will go further and permit evidence of communications
between spouses, not merely as showing the relations between the spouses,
but also as showing the effect on the alienated spouse of the defendant's
actions 21s---which must, of course, be otherwise proved.219  Such testimony
may favor the defendant as showing that the alienation resulted from some-
thing else other than his actions. 2  Such communications should be re-
stricted to the purposes already stated and, so far as is practical, mere state-
ments concerning the defendant's alleged actions should be excluded.22, All
such testimony must be conceded to be somewhat dangerous as tending to
be prejudicial. It should be restricted carefully.22 2
Since the parts of such communications between the spouses relating
solely to alleged acts of the defendant should be excluded so far as is prac-
" Kreager v. Kreager, supra note 194.
2 Smith v. Sheffield, 58 Utah 77, 197 Pac. 605 (1921).
"'Patterson v. Hill, supra note 152; Stocker v. Stocker, 112 Neb. 565, 199 N. W. 849
(1924).
21 Stocker v. Stocker, supra note 213.
Hillers v. Taylor, 116 Md. 165, 81 Atl. 286 (1911); compare same case on previous
appeal in io8 Md. 148, 69 Atl. 715 (i9o8) ; Wallace v. Wallace, supra note 97.
21 Fuller v. Robinson, supra note 171.
m Clendennen v. Bainbridge, 45 S. D. 410, 187 N. W. 727 (922).
OB Rose v. Mitchell, 21 R. I. 270, 43 AtI. 67 (1899) ; Hardwick v. Hardwick, supra note
171; Hayward v. Ham, supra note 177; Daywitt v. Daywitt, 63 Ind. App. 444, 114 N. E. 694
(917) ; Nelson v. Nelson, supra note 68; Fox v. Fuchs, 241 Ill. App. 242 (1926) ; Jackson
v. Jackson, supra note 178.
Welty v. Sparks, 179 Iowa 1390, 162 N. W. 614 (1917) ; Jones v. Jones, supra note 92.
Pooley v. Dutton, supra note 69.
Wendell v. Brown, 142 Wash. 391, 253 Pac. 452 (1927).
-2 Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 193 Pac. 251 (1920).
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tical, communications primarily concerned with such alleged acts rather than
their effect on the alienated spouse should be wholly excluded. 223  Thus dec-
larations by the plaintiff''s husband as to the identity of the woman with
whom he was planning to elope are clearly inadmissible as against the defend-
ant.224  Such evidence is obviously prejudicial: it should be limited strictly
to its proper functions; but when so limited it seems proper to admit it.
Nevertheless, there is substantial authority to the effect that evidence
of such communications between the spouses is inadmissible for any pur-
pose,225 even without a statutory exclusion-unless it is fairly to be considered
part of the res gestce.226 Courts taking this position often assert that such
evidence is objectionable both as hearsay and as privileged.2 7  As has been
shown, it seems clearly to fall within a well settled exception to the hearsay
rule; and the privilege seeems to have no very sensible function in view of
the serious marital difficulties which almost invariably exist when an aliena-
tion action is brought. But many courts regard such exclusion as a settled
rule of the common law which can only be removed by an explicit statute.228
The danger of having such declarations warped in the plaintiff's testimony
and the seriously prejudicial effect of such evidence is also emphasized by
some courts; 229 but as already pointed out such things may be good reasons
for limiting it closely but hardly for wholly excluding it. If all evidence
which may conceivably be prejudicial is to be excluded there will be very
little left to be admitted.
In alienation cases the time of the events or declarations testified to may
become material. Thus some courts exclude evidence of the relationships of
the spouses and of the defendant with them prior to the marriage. 230 The
weight of authority seems to be to the contrary, admitting such evidence so
far as it seems to be pertinent in explaining what happened after the mar-
riage.2 31  The latter rule seems to be the better one, though undoubtedly
evidence of matters prior to the marriage is of less weight than that referring
to more recent events.
Again, a number of courts exclude any evidence of the relationship
between the spouses after their separation,232 at least unless it may fairly
""Preston v. Bowers, 13 Ohio St. I (1861) ; Hillers v. Taylor, io8 Md. 148, 69 At. 715
(19o8) ; Paup v. Paup, 208 Iowa 215, 225 N. W. 251 (1929).
SDalton v. Martin, lO2 W. Va. 595, 136 S. E. 47 (1927) •
Humphrey v. Pope, i Cal. App. 374, 82 Pac. 223 (19o5) ; Leucht v. Leucht, 129 Ky.
700, 112 S. W. 845 (19o8) ; Magers v. Magers, 143 Iowa 750, 123 N. W. 330 (19o9) ; Brison
v. McKellop, smipra note 8o.
Higham v. Vanosdol, supra note 189.
a Leucht v. Leucht; Magers v. Magers, both supra note 225.
Watkins v. Lord, supra note ii.
McGowan v. Armour, 248 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
0 Pooley v. Dutton, supra note 69; Lonnborg v. Lipset, 137 Misc. 292, 241 N. Y. Supp.
691 (1930).
-Cole v. Johnson, supra note 75; Spiry v. Spiry, supra note 85; Wallace v. Wallace,
supra note 97.
2" Harper v. Harper, supra note 175; Johnson v. Richards, supra note 8.
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be said to constitute a part of the res gestae of the separation.233  Here, too,
there are contrary authorities holding that the relationship between the
spouses after separation may have a bearing upon the cause of the separation
and particularly the defendant's relationship to that cause. 234 It would seem
best to treat this problem also as one of judicial discretion. While such evi-
dence is often too remote to have any real pertinency it seems unwise to lay
down a flat rule that it will be excluded under all circumstances.
Vermont has a peculiar and seemingly unique rule. This is that all
evidence of complaints by the alienated spouse concerning the plaintiff and
all activities of any one concerned except the defendant himself are to be
excluded if they take place after the defendant has become intimate with the
alienated spouse. 23 5  The justification given for this peculiar rule is the
danger of collusion between the spouses concerned in the alienation action.
23 6
It does seem probable that if collusion could be shown that it ought to be a
bar even to an alienation action.23 7  Even though one of the spouses is not
a party to the action, formally at least, yet both are quite directly interested,
and collusion between them might lead to serious injustice to the defendant.
On the other hand, there is no such serious danger of collusion as in matri-
monial actions or even in actions for criminal conversation ;23s the alienated
spouse is much more likely to have his sympathies with the defendant than
with his own present or former spouse, the plaintiff. The Vermont rule
therefore seems unsound as an absolute rule of exclusion, though the jury
should no doubt be warned of the possibility of collusion between the spouses
where there seems to be any substantial reason to fear it.
Damages
The problem of damages in an alienation suit is a very embarrassing
one. As in breach of promise suits 239 there is no definite standard, and the
matter is apt to be left pretty much to the jury, which is entitled to take into
consideration many indefinite and purely psychological injuries to which
the plaintiff lays claim. 24 0 The plaintiff may thus recover damages for his
mental suffering and disgrace-and the action is concededly largely of a
sentimental nature. 241  The injury, though not precisely measurable, jus-
Mumper v. Webster, supra note i89.
-'Rose v. Mitchell, supra note 218; Puth v. Zimbleman, 99 Iowa 641, 68 N. W. 895
(i896) ; Boyd v. Strickland, supra note 165.
Rudd v. Rounds, supra note 176; Sanders v. Burnham, 91 Vt. 48o, ioo Atl. 905 (917);
Button v. Knight, 95 Vt. 381, 115 Atl. 499 (921) ; Sargent v. Robertson, supra note 62.
-Fratini v. Caslini, supra note i9S; Sargent v. Robertson, supra note 62.
See Olsen v. Erickson, supra note 13L
Puth v. Zimbleman, supra note 234.
See Brown, Breach of Promise Suits (1929) 77 U. oF PA. L. REV. 474, 480.
.,O See Note (I93O) 66 A. L. R. 6og. See also I3 R. C. L. 148L
" See discussion in Rash v. Pratt, supra note 131. See also Hartpence v. Rogers, supra
note 123; Lyen v. Lyen, supra note 104.
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tifies substantial damages.242  Courts admit a certain obligation to prevent
undue prejudice in the matter of damages, 243 but also emphasize the fact
that the jury has broad discretion without definite limits. 244  Courts on
appeal often sustain verdicts which they regard as excessive but not suffi-
ciently so to justify interference with the jury's discretion. 24 5 Furthermore,
as will be considered more in detail hereafter, punitive damages are very
generally allowed in alienation suits.
Where a wife is the plaintiff she is entitled to have the jury consider the
loss of her husband's support as an additional ground for damages; and this
even though he is in fact contributing to her support under the terms of the
divorce decree. 246
Under this situation it is naturally to be expected that verdicts will be
large and often much influenced by the feeling of sympathy which the jury
is apt to have toward a plaintiff thus wronged. Such is the fact. The largest
judgment which has been found in the reports is for $125,000,247 but there
are several others for substantial amounts up to $I5,000.248 While these
verdicts are somewhat larger than the average, they indicate that a defendant
who is open to this sort of action is subjecting himself to the possibility of
large damages.
The most effective remedy which the defendant has in this matter is
the power of the trial judge to reduce damages which he regards as clearly
excessive. At times this power is exercised with considerable vigor as in
Woodhouse v. Woodhouse,249 where a verdict of $465,000 was reduced to
$125,ooo, and in Overton v. Overton,250 where damages of $150,000 were
reduced to $60,000. Generally the reduction is not so great; in fact these
are the largest reductions found, but substantial reductions are not uncom-
mon.25 1  In all these cases, however, there is still left a substantial amount
which the defendant is required to pay.
- Valentine v. Pollak, supra note I.
2 Nicholson v. Nicholson, 22 S. W. (2d) 514 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
2U Fuller v. Robinson, supra note 171.
Amellin v. Leone, szpra note 132.
Allard v. LaPlain, 125 Me. 44, 13o Atl. 737 (1925). In the Washington case of the
same name, supra note 7, suit was brought on this judgment in that state.2 7 Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, supra note 92. This case has also a rather distinct and un-
regrettable uniqueness in having a total of IOI headnotes. This judgment, and most of the
others cited in this connection, included punitive damages.
M2 ohn v. Tingley, supra note 29 ($IOOOOO) ; Mulock v. Ulizio, 3 N. J. Misc. 631, 129
Atl. 204 (1925) ($25,000) ; Bradbury v. Brooks, supra note 13 ($25,000) ; Lyen v. Lyen,
supra note 104 ($15,OOO) ; Hollinghausen v. Ade, supra note 32 ($15,000) ; McAllister v.
McAllister, supra note 68 ($I5,OOO).
0" Supra note 92.
-'Supra note 133.
Regenvetter v. Ball, 131 Wash. 155, 229 Pac. 321 (1924) ($27,5oo reduced to $2oooo);
Lanigan v. Lanigan, supra note 25 ($22,5oo reduced to $ioooo) ; Peak v. Rhyno, supra note
155 ($i6,75o reduced to $8,ooo).
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In a few cases a verdict in favor of the plaintiff has been reversed be-
cause of excessive damages.25 2  This happens comparatively rarely, and
usually only when there is fairly definite evidence indicating that damages
should be small. On the other hand, there are several cases where a judg-
ment for merely nominal damages has been reversed on the ground that
nominal damages are inadequate.253  Where a plaintiff proves a cause of
action for alienation of affections the situation invariably justifies and even
requires substantial damages. 254
Apart from all this, as has already been indicated, punitive damages are
almost invariably allowed. In view of the obvious vagueness of the basis
for computing compensatory damages it clearly follows there is no definite
line between compensatory and punitive damages in this sort of action; in
fact it has been stated with much apparent reason that damages in an action
for alienation of affections are almost entirely punitive. 25 However this
may be, most authorities avowedly permit punitive damages in this sort of
case.256  Quite naturally courts will decline to interfere on the basis of the
amount of the verdict when it seems that punitive damages are allowable
even though the amount of the verdict is clearly excessive in so far as com-
pensatory damages are concerned. 25 7 It seems that punitive damages need not
be claimed by the plaintiff in his pleading. 258
However, to justify an award of punitive damages, malice in its strict
sense, or at least a wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights, must be
shown.259  This is, of course, not properly required for merely compensatory
damages. The malice or wantonness may be shown by indirect and circum-
stantial evidence; and a mere showing of deliberate action by the defendant
may sometimes be sufficient for this purpose.2 0
It has been held that no punitive damages can be awarded unless there
are actual damages ;261 that is to say, there must be substantial compensatory
damages as a prerequisite for the award of punitive damages. However, a
New York court has allowed punitive damages in a case where only nominal
"-2Okrent v. Raffa, supra note 73; Sivley v. Sivley, 96 Miss. 137, 51 So. 457 (191o);
Allen v. Rossi, 128 Me. 201, 146 AtI. 692 (1929) ; Scharwath v. Brooks, 145 Atl. 727 (N. J.1929).
9 Bracken v. Champlin, 114 Kan. 882, 220 Pac. 1027 (1923); Riggs v. Smith, supra
note I.
w See Valentine v. Pollak, supra note I.
See (igi) 6 CAliF. L. REV. 379.
SWarner v. Miller, supra note 58; Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, supra note 92; Holling-
hausen v. Ade, supra note 32; Oskamp v. Oskamp, 20 Ohio App. 349, 152 N. E. 208 (1925);
Harlow v. Harlow, supra note 75; Rash v. Pratt, supra note 131.
_7 Rockwell v. Rockwell, supra note 66.
Joseph v. Naylor, supra note 15.
Button v. Knight, supra note 235; Cottle v. Johnson, supra note 2o4; Kleber v. Allin,
supra note 61.
Butterfield v. Ennis, supra note 33; Bradbury v. Brooks, supra note 13.
Gilham v. Devereaux, 67 Mont. 75, 214 Pac. 6o6 (1923).
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compensatory damages ($i) were awarded,, 6" the court saying that the jury
evidently thought that the wife (the alienated party) had little affection for
her husband but nevertheless desired to punish the defendant for his "dis-
regard of the marital relationship in its aspect of menace to the community".
Assuming that punitive damages can be justified in any case-a problem
beyond the scope of this article-the latter decision seems justified.
When punitive damages are properly awardable, the decided weight of
authority permits evidence of the defendant's wealth, 26 3 but on this issue
alone.264  This is obviously justifiable, since the adequate punishment of a
wealthy person will obviously require much higher damages than if he
were comparatively poor. If there is more than one defendant it would
appear that evidence of wealth of any one of them would be inadmissible
against the others and that therefore punitive damages would in such a case
be unrecoverable ;265 but there is authority to the contrary.26 6 On the other
hand, proof that the defendant has little wealth is not absolutely conclusive
against the awarding of punitive damages; as one court puts it, he still may
have prospects. 267 But it would seem that considerable leniency should be
shown in the amount of punitive damages in such a case.
In this whole matter of punitive damages this action has a very close
analogy to the action for breach of promise of marriage.268  Unfortunately,
this analogy is carried so far as to follow the peculiar rules governing proof
of the defendant's wealth in breach of promise actions. Thus the plaintiff
may prove the defendant's reputation for wealth and thereby subject him to
having the damages computed on what people suppose him to have rather
than what he actually has. 269 This unjust result is partially remedied by the
illogical rule that the defendant may rebut such evidence of his reputed wealth
by showing what property he actually has 27 0-again following the unfortu-
nate analogy of breach of promise suits.
A few courts which do admit punitive damages in this sort of action
nevertheless refuse to admit evidence of the defendant's wealth.271  This
doctrine seems less logical in view of the fact that the defendant's wealth is
"I Buteau v. Naegeli, supra note 13o. The Appellate Division reduced the judgment from
$5,000 to $I,218.76, but wrote no opinion. Obviously this is still a substantial judgment for
punitive damages.
0See 13 R. C. L. 1475. See also Johnson v. Allen, supra note 136; Hargraves v. Ballou,
supra note IO.
'Allard v. LaPlain, supra note 246; Ramsey v. Ramsey, supra note iOI.
SLeavell v. Leavell, 114 Mo. App. 24, 89 S. W. 55 (19o5).
- See Oskamn v. Oskamp, supra note 256. See also White v. White, supra note 43.
Hargraves v. Ballou, supra note 10.
s See Brown, supra note 239.
Leavell v. Leavell, supra note 265, holding however that evidence of the actual wealth
of the defendant may be shown on the issue of punitive damages-though not on the issue
of compensatory damages.
- Hargraves v. Ballou, supra note 10.
07 Stanton v. Cox, 162 Miss. 438, 139 So. 458 (1932). See also Jenness v. Simpson,
supra note I.
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certainly a pertinent circumstance in connection with the amount of punitive
damages; but the absurd way in which the courts permit such wealth to be
proved and disproved gives a certain practical justification for the narrow
rule laid down by these courts.
A rather curious situation arises with respect to punitive damages in
actions against parents and other close relatives. It would seem that since
such relatives can only be held liable if they are guilty of actual malice, the
mere fact of their being held at all would necessarily subject them to liability
for punitive damages. In other words, the very malice which subjects them
to any liability also subjects them to punishment by way of punitive damages.
This is frankly avowed by the Supreme Court of North Dakota 2 72 and the
same result seems to be reached in several other cases where a relative entitled
to the favorable presumption already discussed, but held liable because of his
malice, was held also to have been properly compelled to pay punitive dam-
ages.27 3 The possible objection to this is that it puts'parents and other close
relatives on a worse footing as to punitive damages than other persons; but
this difficulty is theoretical rather than practical, since the parent's liability
to pay punitive damages results immediately from his freedom from liability
to pay any damages at all in many situations where an outsider would be
so liable.
Several courts deny punitive damages in alienation cases in toto.2 7 4
However, most if not all of these courts do not permit punitive damages in
any sort of case 275 so that the disallowance in alienation cases is not peculiar
to that kind of action.
Equitable Relief and Miscellaneous
In view of the nature of an alienation suit, particularly the rather indef-
inite but largely personal measure of the wrong, it would seem that com-
pensatory damages are ordinarily an inadequate remedy and that even puni-
tive damages, when allowed, will not adequately compensate the plaintiff for
what he has lost. From this standpoint it would appear that where the
plaintiff acts soon enough, he ought to be entitled to relief by having the
defendant enjoined from acting in such a way as to deprive the plaintiff of
his right of consortium. There has been a considerable amount of discussion
Oster v. Oster, 49 N. D. 723, 193 N. W. 316 (1923).
Moelleur v. Moelleur, supra note 6o; Harlow v. Harlow, supra note 75; Allen v. Rossi,
supra note 252.
-' Moulin v. Monteleone, supra note 27 (see discussion of the Louisiana law in that
note) ; French v. Deane, 19 Colo. 504, 36 Pac. 6og (1894) (now allowed in Colorado, by stat-
ute) ; Sohl v. Sohl, 114 Neb. 353, 207 N. W. 669 (1926) ; Phillips v. Thomas, 70 Wash. 533,
127 Pac. 97 (1912) ; Wood v. Miller, 147 Wash. 251, 265 Pac. 727 (1928).
Washington may be an exception to this rule, the court indicating that the denial of
punitive damages is applicable only in alienation suits. Phillips v. Thomas, supra note 274.
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of this problem by legal theorists 276 -more perhaps than the amount of
actual case material. It seems to be generally agreed that equity has juris-
diction, because of the obvious inadequacy of the legal remedy of damages;
but there is serious question as to whether such jurisdiction should be exer-
cised, both because of the difficulty of enforcing any orders which the court
may make and because of the inherent undesirability of trying to arrange
domestic controversies through the rather crude medium of injunctions.
Texas 277 has squarely taken the position that an injunction will be
granted in a case where the plaintiff shows a deliberate and continuing
attempt by the defendant to deprive the former of his rights of consortium.
There is a dictum to the same effect in a decision by one of the lower New
York courts. 278
On the other hand, Ohio has in a very well considered opinion taken the
opposite view, holding that in no circumstance has equity jurisdiction to give
an injunction in such a case.279 The dissenting opinions seem to be much
better reasoned than the majority opinion,2 0 but even the dissenting judges
are constrained to admit that such jurisdiction is somewhat dangerous and
should be sparingly exercised. The very scarcity of decisions on the point
indicates that equitable relief in this sort of action has little if any scope in
most jurisdictions. Problems of enforceability and public policy seeem to
require that this matter be settled, even though somewhat inadequately, by
ordinary suits for money damages.
Two cases have been found which involve something of a reversal of
the ordinary situation in alienation suits. One of these is Swartzlander v.
Swartzlander,21 1 where the husband sued a third perion for the alienation
of his wife and was successful. He assigned the judgment to two other
persons. The wife now sues to subject the judgment in the hands of the
assignees to the husband's liability on a separation agreement. This ingen-
ious scheme was, however, defeated by the court; it was held that the wife
was barred by her own wrongdoing (in being alienated) even though the
husband acted improperly in assigning the judgment.
A still more curious situation appears in Work v. Campbell.2"2  Here
the wife sued the husband of her own aunt alleging that the defendant told
her lies about her (the plaintiff's) husband, thus causing the plaintiff to treat
I The most detailed discussion of the general subject is in Moreland, Injunctive Gontrol
of Family Relations (1930) I8 Ky. L. J. 207. See also Notes in (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 373;
(1925) 34 YALE L. J. 327; (1925) 38 HARV. L. REv. 396; (1925)' 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 97.
2Ex parte Warfield, 4o Tex. Cr. App. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899) ; Smith v. Womack,
271 S. W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App., 1925).
-8 See Hall v. Smith, 8o Misc. 85, 14o N. Y. Supp. 796 (1913). Such an injunction was
disallowed on the facts in Ellis v. Ellis, 55 Misc. 34, io6 N. Y. Supp. 217 (1907).
1 9 Snedaker v. King, iii Ohio St. 225, 145 N. E. 15 (1924).
The majority opinion was "per curiam", though there was a concurring opinion by
Justice Allen. Justice Day wrote the most forceful dissenting opinion.
127 Misc. 8Ol, 217 N. Y. Supp. 467 (1926).
164 Cal. 343, 128 Pac. 943 (1912).
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her husband so cruelly that he left her. The theory of the action was not
entirely clear to the court, but it decided, it seems quite correctly, that no
cause of action for alienation or enticement of the husband was shown; the
court suggested that the husband could probably sue the defendant for the
enticement of the wife, the present plaintiff. There was a dictum, however,
that the plaintiff did show a cause of action for deceit. This is the only case
which has been found where what was alleged to be an alienation suit was
brought by the alienated spouse.
Policy of the Action
It remains to consider whether the action for alienation of affections is a
desirable one. This involves a consideration of the problem as to whether
the action performs a useful social function and, if it does, whether there
may not still be such serious objections to it as to make its abolition desirable.
Taking up this latter problem first, it is clear that there are in fact
serious objections to the action. The most obvious one is the uncertain basis
for the damages and the fact that such damages are largely punitive.
283
Even when they purport to be compensatory, the measure of damages is so
uncertain as to result quite clearly in occasional and perhaps quite serious
injustice to the defendant.
It is also urged that a consideration of the history of the action shows
that it has no proper place in our modern law.28 4 Undoubtedly the action
for alienation of affections as well as that for criminal conversation origi-
nated in the husband's power over the wife and was therefore originally
restricted to the husband alone. It is therefore argued that the wife's eman-
cipation, which takes away the original basis for both of these actions, should
have resulted in their total abolition. But this is an obvious non sequitur
since the abolition of the original basis for the action does not necessarily
prove that it has not still justification under modem conditions.
Another objection, though one of a theoretical rather than practical
nature, is the difficulty of defining the wrong precisely. As has been seen,
the courts are not entirely clear as to whether this is a personal tort or
one to property.285 This theoretical uncertainty is not of itself serious, but
does indicate that the action should be somewhat closely restricted.28 6 The
frequent use of the action for purposes of extortion 287 emphasizes this
objection.
In spite of all these and other objections which could no doubt be sug-
gested, it is submitted that the action is still justifiable and performs a useful
Supra note 255.
See Lippman, The Breakdow; of Consortium (1930) 30 CoL. L. REv. 651.
Supra note 255.
SSee (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 535.
Miller v. Levine, supra note 85.
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social function. That function is the preservation of the home. No one
can doubt that the American home is by no means stable in these days, and
very few would doubt that any influence, legal or otherwise, which would
increase its stability is to be encouraged. 2s, The problem of policy has been
before the English courts very clearly in the recent case of Place v. Searle,2 9
where the court, reversing the opinion of the redoubtable Justice McCardie
to the contrary, held that the emancipation of women has had no effect upon
the action for alienation of affections. Each spouse still has a right of con-
sortium in the other, though our modern statutes have radically and properly
limited the husband's power to enforce such rights directly against his wife.
The American courts are undoubtedly following the same idea, though gen-
erally without passing so explicitly upon the question of policy.
The only real argument which can be made that the action is harmful
is because of the possible injustice to the defendant. But it seems that such
a defendant is not entitled to overmuch sympathy. If he is to be held at all
he must be shown to have intentionally interfered in the marital relations of
another person; in other words, he has intentionally attempted to break up
some one else's home, and has had at least a measure of success. If the
uncertainty of the damages will terrify some persons, who otherwise would
be guilty of such a thing, from attempting ;+ +hat i a1l the better.F
ther, if the defendant is a parent or other near relative of one of the spouses
and honestly believes that the protection of that spouse requires the ter-
mination of the marital relations, he can act without serious fear of the
consequences; for it is believed that not merely the holdings of the courts
but also the opinions of juries are generally very favorable to such relatives,
unless there is fairly clear evidence that the alienation was not the result of
proper motives. With all its faults, then, the action for alienation of affec-
tions is on the whole desirable, and while it should no doubt be somewhat
limited, such limitations should not be permitted to diminish the desirable
effect which the possibility of liability in this action now has in discouraging
the intentional breaking up of homes.
' See Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium (1923) 22 MicH. L. REv. I.
See also the dissenting opinion in Bourne v. Bourne, supra note 48, at 535, 185 Pac. at 497.
[1932] 2 K. B. 497. The upper court held clearly that the old case of Winsmore v.
Greenback, mspra note i, still represents the law of England.
